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SAME-SEX CYNICISM AND THE SELF-
DEFEATING PURSUIT OF SOCIAL
ACCEPTANCE THROUGH LITIGATION
James G. Dwyer*
THE Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in DeBoer v. Snyder1should be cause for optimistic cheer for someone like myself whostrongly supports extending legal marriage to same-sex couples.
Instead it occasions grave disappointment and foreboding, because the
expected result—an imperious judicial command that all states reform
their marriage laws—will be both unprincipled and counter-productive.
As a legal scholar, I recognize the distinction between something being
the right thing to do and its being a matter of constitutional right, and I
know that at this point in time the case for the latter with respect to same-
sex marriage is untenable. I say “at this point in time” because, contrary
to conventional wisdom,2 the gay rights movement’s3 extraordinary string
of successes in the past dozen years—in particular, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Lawrence4 and Windsor,5 state court victories beginning with
Goodridge,6 and voluntary adoption of same-sex marriage by many state
legislatures—has fatally undermined (as a matter of logic and doctrine)
the Movement’s case for a Supreme Court ruling that same-sex couples
have a federal constitutional right to legal marriage, the centerpiece of
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. Challenging
comments from Neal Devins and Laura Heymann were very helpful to me in developing
this article.
1. 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015).
2. See Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual
Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2006) (“Lawrence has
still been understood by many as, first and foremost, a victory in the fight for a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage.”).
3. There is not a single movement for gay rights, but as with other civil-rights causes,
there are recognized organizational leaders who act in a somewhat-coordinated fashion
and attempt to present a unified front to donors, political actors, the public, and the legal
system. See Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop. 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAWYER,
Jan. 20, 2010 (“Nationally, the LGBT legal groups–ACLU, GLAD, Lambda Legal, and
NCLR–have a strong tradition of sharing resources, knowledge, and strategy. . . .”). I will
use “Movement” to mean the loosely connected collection of persons and efforts focused
on achieving greater legal rights and privileges for gays and lesbians, while acknowledging
this simplification elides meaningful distinctions among organizations and viewpoints.
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
6. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
3
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gay-rights activism today.7
As explained in Part I.A, Lawrence destroyed the connection between
legal marriage and freedom to engage in core aspects of family life that
was the basis for the Supreme Court’s characterization of legal marriage
as a “fundamental liberty” decades ago. Lawrence transformed the right
to marry from a negative liberty to a positive-right claim for gratuitous
government benefits. The further fact that legal marriage has been availa-
ble to same-sex couples living in every state since 2003, given that Massa-
chusetts has no residency requirement for marriage licenses,  coupled
with current federal recognition of same-sex legal marriages regardless of
a couple’s state of residency, further diminishes the significance of any
particular state’s refusal to issue marriage certificates itself to same-sex
couples.
In addition, as discussed in Part I.B, the legislative victories, along with
a major shift in public opinion, demonstrate that the lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, and transgender (“LGBT”) community in the United States is now
harnessing political power far out of proportion to its own numbers and
therefore can no longer demonstrate a need for special judicial solicitude,
thus further undermining an equality-based claim to constitutional enti-
tlement. These two transformations, one legal and the other political,
have eliminated the case for heightened Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny
that could plausibly have been made fifteen years ago, yet courts and
academics have failed to acknowledge their significance.8
Part II, in the context of explaining why alleged “animus” is irrelevant,
points up a further flaw in judicial and scholarly analysis of same-sex mar-
riage thus far—namely, a conflating of several different types of state law
provisions that actually call for different analyses. Disaggregating them
makes apparent that any state statutory Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”) was actually legally meaningless; it made no change in the
law. Ironically, if the Supreme Court fails to recognize this, treats the
7. See, e.g., Roadmap to Victory, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry
.org/pages/roadmap-to-victory (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
8. I will not address the fringe argument that opposite-sex-only marriage laws are
subject to heightened scrutiny because they constitute gender discrimination, see, e.g.,
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring), except to note
that it misunderstands the basis for the state’s denial of a marriage license. People apply
for a license as a couple, and the state does not refuse same-sex couples a license because
of their being a male couple or a female couple, but rather because of their sex-sameness.
Even looking at it from an individual’s perspective, the state does not refuse any individual
the right to marry the person of his or her choice because of that other person’s gender per
se, but rather because of that person’s sex-sameness. Thus, if the first individual’s sex were
undisclosed, the exclusion could not apply regardless of the other’s (disclosed) sex; it can
apply only after the sex of both persons is known and found to be the same. Analogously,
laws proscribing incestuous marriages do not discriminate against people based on which
family they belong to per se, but rather based on their family-sameness. Strictly speaking,
traditional marriage laws also do not discriminate based on sexual orientation; they would
also preclude marriage between two heterosexual female friends together seeking legal
marriage for its financial benefits. But the norm that only intimate partners get married is
so pervasive that the disparate impact on gays and lesbians is stark, making it sensible to
treat the situation as one of discrimination based on sexual orientation.
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DOMA statutory provisions as the relevant governing law (rather than
the original marriage laws enacted with no thought to same-sex couples),
ascribes animus to their passage, and rests its decision on that animus,
then the conservative frenzy to pass state DOMAs will turn out to have
made same-sex marriage more likely rather than less.
Part III explains why traditional marriage laws should easily pass ra-
tional basis review (even if “with bite”), if only judges could grasp and
accurately characterize the state interest that actually differentiates same-
sex couples from opposite-sex couples. The stream of victories for the
Movement principally reflects weak lawyering by defenders of state laws,
systematic distortion of the state’s long-recognized responsible-procrea-
tion aim by plaintiffs’ attorneys and sympathetic judges, and widespread
adoption of counter-arguments so obviously flawed it seems unlikely the
advocates or judges expressing them actually believe what they are say-
ing. Judges must fear that regardless of what reason, precepts of demo-
cratic governance, or constitutional doctrine might counsel, if they rule
against same-sex marriage they will be viewed ever after as having been
on “the wrong side of history.” Willful obfuscation by liberal academics
posing as “friends of the court” might also have played a role.
And the parade marches on, nearly at its destination. Despite the re-
markable shift in popular and elite support to their side, and even though
four in ten LGBT persons preferred that they not do so,9 Movement ad-
vocates and sympathizers continued the push for a federal judicial resolu-
tion,10 with lawyers and plaintiffs angling to be the ones whose names go
in the history books.11 Now the Movement has arrived at the steps of the
9. See A Survey of LGBT Americans, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 67 (June 13, 2013), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/06/SDT_LGBT_Americans_06-2013.pdf [hereafter
“Pew Center Report”] (finding that 39% of LGBT survey respondents stated that “[t]he
push for same-sex marriage has taken too much focus away from other issues important to
LGBT people”).
10. After Vermont became the first state legislatively to adopt same-sex marriage,
Movement leaders expressed an intention to seek similar political victories in other states.
See Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A1. This reflected pessimism about federal court prospects rather
than a principled commitment to federalism or democracy. See ACLU ET AL., Make
Change, Not Lawsuits, ACLU 1-2 (2009), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/pdfs/lgbt/make_change_20090527.pdf (urging same-sex couples to forbear from fed-
eral court lawsuits in favor of state court suits and legislative efforts, but only until success
in state judicial and legislative quarters became more widespread, so a federal court lawsuit
would have greater chance of success). Now the litigation strategy is dominant, perhaps
simply because it is producing unprecedented results. The principle division of opinion in
the Movement recently has been concern about the pace of litigation rather than whether
grassroots efforts to change public opinion are preferable. See JO BECKER, FORCING THE
SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 3-10 (2014); DAVID BOIES & THEO-
DORE B. OLSON, REDEEMING THE DREAM: THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 67
(2014). This is not to say there is no political activism going on, but it is mostly confined to
pursuit of other rights for sexual minorities. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Jeremy W.
Peters, Gay Rights Push Shifts Its Focus South and West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2014, at A1
(describing grass-roots advocacy in traditionally conservative states for a number of civil
rights).
11. At a recent conference at William & Mary, a panelist who is a correspondent for a
major newspaper compared the lawyers in the marriage cases now before the Supreme
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Supreme Court, and everyone in legal academia fully expects that Justice
Kennedy will declare victory for the Movement in a majority opinion de-
void of analytical structure, careful logic, or reference to general princi-
ples, lest anything he says be used in another case for a result he does not
like.
Meanwhile, in the branches of government charged with making policy
judgments and effecting fairness among different constituencies, many
state legislators and executive branch officials have, for the first time, ex-
pressed support for same-sex marriage, once they saw the wind blowing
strongly in that direction.12 But rather than actively seeking to reform
state laws themselves, through the legislative process, they have stood by
cheerleading as federal courts invalidated state statutes.13 They let fed-
eral courts assume the responsibility and heat for doing what they them-
selves should have done. My state senator responded to my letter asking
him to pursue legislative reform with the evasive statement, “The Senate
did not consider any legislation dealing with marriage equality during the
2014 regular session,” begging the question why he does not introduce
any legislation himself.14 My representative to the Virginia House of Del-
egates, despite publicly applauding the district court ruling in Norfolk,
never responded to my request and never took any steps to obviate a
Supreme Court mandate by making change legislatively.
There has been, then, much of what might fairly be characterized as
cynicism coursing through the veins of same-sex-marriage advocacy and
decision making, with little concern for larger political principles or intel-
lectual integrity, and with little interest—even among those with the
power and responsibility—in securing legal marriage for same-sex
couples by convincing fellow citizens and their representatives to fix
problems in state law by majoritarian decision-making after public delib-
eration. The end result will be that same-sex marriage spreads throughout
the United States on a tidal wave of unprincipled judicial fiat, culminating
in a Supreme Court decision devoid of clear and intelligible rationale.
Court to self-serving car salesmen intent on convincing the Court to buy their “vehicle” as
the best available. Indeed, one might ask why the plaintiffs’ attorneys have not coordinated
their efforts to steer the Court to the case that is actually best for the cause.
12. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory
Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 LAW & SOC. IN-
QUIRY 449, 455 (2014) (noting that most liberal legislators, along with President Clinton,
supported passage of state and federal DOMAs in the 1990s); see also id. at 457 (“Political
elites—reading the tea leaves of the polls, but also under pressure from politically astute
LGBT advocates—soon began to favor legalizing same-sex marriage. Consider the ‘evolu-
tion’ of President Barack Obama. . . . Obama was soon not alone; following his victory in
the November 2012 elections, a number of senators and representatives announced that
they too had “evolved.”
13. See, e.g., Markus Schmidt, Federal Judge Strikes Down Virginia’s Gay Marriage
Ban, RICHMONDTIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 13, 2014) www.richmond.com/news/virginia/gov-
ernment-politics/article_a240d8c2-9525-11e3-93ca-001a4bcf6878.html (noting floor state-
ments by Virginia legislators after a federal district court invalidated Virginia marriage
laws).
14. Email from Virginia State Senator John Miller (May 1, 2014). (on file with author).
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Why care, if one supports same-sex marriage? Apart from rule of law
concerns, and without repeating all that others have said about likely
backlash, there is the fundamental problem, as explained in Part IV, that
courts cannot deliver what LGBT persons seem to want most—dignity.
Court victories are hollow victories for the LGBT community, failing to
deliver the societal respect it seeks, and in fact removing the opportunity
for collective expression of such respect through voluntary legislative re-
form or popular referendum. A Supreme Court victory will be counter-
productive with respect to that aim. What sexual minorities get is not
acceptance by the people with whom they share a neighborhood, a politi-
cal community, a state, and a nation. Rather, they get the power to force
something on those people. They deserve better.
On the flipside, we in the privileged group lose the opportunity to act,
to do the right thing ourselves, to be participants in the progress and the
healing that marriage equality should entail. We are also left cheering the
courts for having taken this decision out of our hands and made it for us
and instead of us, implicitly assuming us incapable of doing it. We are
politically infantilized and forever branded as the enemy of gay rights
who had to be vanquished, rather than as (finally) welcoming neighbors.
Perhaps we also deserve better.15
A loss at the Supreme Court, throwing the issue back into the hands of
the public, whose support grows every day, forcing state legislators to
take and justify a stand, triggering robust public discussion about respect
and equality, thus might actually be the best thing that could happen for
the LGBT community. Or better yet, what if the Movement made this
choice itself? What if the leaders at the last minute called off the lawyers
and let the American public know that is not how they want to “win”?
What if they chose engagement rather than circumvention, reciprocal re-
spect rather than cynicism? What then?
I. INCREMENTAL SUCCESSES CAN FORESTALL
FINAL VICTORY
Constitutional challenges to traditional marriage laws have invoked
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Under either, when
the challenged law denies something that is a matter of fundamental
right, it is subject to heightened judicial review, putting on the state the
burden of providing substantial, evidence-based justification for infring-
ing that right.16 If what is at stake is not a matter of fundamental right,
heightened scrutiny might still apply in an equal protection challenge if
the court treats the challengers as members of a group in special need of
15. Cf. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014)
(“It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the voters are not capable of
deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”); DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388, 402 (2014) (“If a federal court denies the people suffrage over an issue long
thought to be within their power, they deserve an explanation.”)
16. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1218 (10th Cir. 2014).
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judicial protection from the legislative process.17 If neither is true, a court
must place on private parties challenging a law the near-insurmountable
burden of demonstrating that the aspect of the law denying them what
they want (either a universal denial of something or a discrimination) is
utterly irrational insofar as it serves no legitimate state purpose
whatsoever.
It is extremely frustrating for anyone alleging a constitutional violation
to have a court conclude that rational basis review applies. It always
seems unfair to those who are sufficiently unhappy about a state’s law
that they would suffer the lost time, expense, and anguish of filing a law-
suit, when the court stacks the deck so strongly in favor of the govern-
ment. But this doctrine reflects the reality that states must both prohibit
some things universally and must make discriminations in conferring ben-
efits, or else government could not function. Unless a particular legal per-
mission or state-conferred benefit is so important that a person’s
fundamental welfare depends on it, or unless government discrimination
in conferral of benefits appears to reflect illicit exclusion of the com-
plaining group from the political process, courts have to let the elected
branches of government act on their judgments of what is fair and effi-
cient, so long as they can provide some rational justification. The stark
reality is that the victories the Movement has already secured through
Supreme Court decisions, state court mandates, and uncompelled legisla-
tive action or popular vote have eviscerated both bases for heightened
review of traditional marriage laws.
A. LEGAL MARRIAGE IS NO LONGER A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Movement lawyers, sympathetic state officials, and family law profes-
sors submitting amicus briefs in support of same-sex marriage repeatedly
and simplistically assert that “marriage” is a matter of fundamental right,
citing Supreme Court precedents from decades ago.18 Lower federal
17. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
courts should be more circumspect about legislative classifications when “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”).
18. See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari, at 5, Deboer v. Snyder (2015) (No. 14-571) (“The
right to marry is a fundamental freedom. . .”) [hereinafter DeBoer Cert. Petition]; id. at 18-
19; Brief of Amici Curiae Joan Heifetz Hollinger et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees
and Affirmance at 11, Deboer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. June 16, 2014) [hereinafter
Bourke Amicus 1]; Brief of Amici Curiae Family Law and Conflict of Law Professors in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affrimance at 24, Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d
542 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-5291). [hereinafter Bourke Amicus 2); Memorandum in Sup-
port of Change in Legal Position by Defendant Janet M. Rainey, Bostic v. Rainey, at 7-10
970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 2:13-CV-395) [hereinafter Rainey Memorandum];
Ky. Office of the Attorney General, Statement from Attorney General Conway, available at
http://ag.ky.gov/Pages/default.aspx; Statement of Or. Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum
on Pending Litigation Challenging Same-Sex Marriage Ban (February 20, 2014), available
at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/Pages/2014/rel022014.aspx [hereinafter Rosenblum
Statement]; Virginia Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Herring Changes
Virginia’s Legal Position in Marriage Equality Case, available at http://www.ag.virginia.gov/
Media%20and%20News%20Releases/News_Releases/Herring/012314_Bostic_v_Rainey
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court judges have unreflectively agreed.19 Remarkably, even the lawyers
purportedly defending state law have unthinkingly conceded that legal
marriage is a matter of fundamental right.20 The only debate concerning
the fundamental right basis for heightened review has focused on the
level of specificity at which the plaintiffs’ claim should be understood—
that is, as a right to same-sex legal marriage (which flunks the ‘history
and tradition’ test) or the broader, more generic right simply to legal mar-
riage (which is assumed to be a fundamental right).21 That debate is irrel-
evant, because neither characterization leads to a sound due process
claim or to heightened equal protection scrutiny. This is why:
The last time the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge
to an exclusionary state marriage law was in 1987, in Turner v. Safley,22
and the last time the Court applied heightened scrutiny to an exclusion-
ary marriage law on the basis of an assumption that legal marriage consti-
tutes “a fundamental liberty” was in 1978, in Zablocki v. Redhail, nearly
four decades ago.23 Is it a fundamental “liberty” today, for anyone?
To answer, it is essential to maintain a distinction that courts, advo-
cates, and scholars routinely elide—namely, between state conferral of
legal marriage status, evidenced by a marriage certificate, versus the so-
cial practice of having a wedding and living together as a married couple
to create a family. The former is what is at stake in same-sex marriage
litigation, but the latter is what most matters to people.24 And whereas
.html; Schmidt, supra note 13 (relating statement by Virginia’s Lieutenant Governor:
“Marriage is a fundamental and an incredibly personal right of all Virginians . . . .”).
19. See, e.g, Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring);
Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1209; Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (“This
[Fourteenth Amendment] liberty includes the fundamental right to marry.”); De Leon v.
Perry, SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 WL 715741 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) (asserting “the
importance of marriage as a fundamental right and its relation to an individual’s rights to
liberty, privacy, and association,” without considering whether Lawrence had altered this
relation between legal marriage and other values); Lee v. Orr, 13-CV-8719, 2014 WL
683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014) (invalidating Illinois’ marriage law and stating, with no
mention of Lawrence or other recent developments, “This Court has no trepidation that
marriage is a fundamental right to be equally enjoyed by all individuals of consenting age
regardless of their race, religion, or sexual orientation. . .”); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d.
1070, 1079-80 (10th Cir. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421-22 (M.D. Pa.
2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 991, 997-98 (W.D. Wis. 2014). The Seventh
Circuit declined to “engage with the parties’ ‘fundamental right’ debate,” because it
treated sexual minorities as a protected class. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648,657 (7th Cir.
2014).
20. See, e.g., Latta, 771 F.3d at 477 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“Plaintiffs and defend-
ants agree that there is a fundamental right to marry”); Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 375. (“The
Opponents and Proponents agree that marriage is a fundamental right.”); Lee, 2014 WL
683680 at, *1; BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 176 (indicating that attorneys defending
Prop 8 agreed that marriage is a fundamental right).
21. See, e.g., Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1209 (“Appellants contend that these precedents and
others establish only that opposite-sex marriage is a fundamental right.”); Robicheaux v.
Caldwell, 2014 WL 4347099, at *8 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2014) (“There is simply no fundamen-
tal right, historically or traditionally, to same-sex marriage.”).
22. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
23. 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (prescribing “critical examination”).
24. Examples of judges conflating these two things include Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1209,
1212, (“The importance of marriage is based in great measure on ‘personal aspects’ includ-
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the Court has treated the latter (social family formation) as a first-order
right—that is, something inherently a matter of personal liberty and the
pursuit of happiness, it has treated the former (state licensure) as merely
a second-order right, of no inherent importance but just a precondition
for the latter. Advocates for same-sex marriage get most of their rhetori-
cal traction by conflating these two things in the minds of judges and the
public.25 The Certiorari Petition in DeBoer v. Snyder, for example, asserts
that the right to marry “encompasses the right ‘to establish a home.’”26
What connection is there actually between the two today?
Significantly, state licensure has never been a precondition for a non-
legal wedding—that is, for two people publicly to express their love and
permanent commitment to each other, to exchange vows and rings in
front of family and friends, and thereby to receive “public acknowledg-
ment of their mutual commitment.”27 First Amendment rights of assem-
bly, speech, and religious exercise preclude the state from interfering with
such a gathering and public expression, which in and of itself flouts no
state law.28 Thus, gays and lesbians have always been legally free every-
where in the United States to have as big and romantic a wedding cere-
mony and celebration as they might like, so long as they did not defraud
anyone by claiming that the ceremony had legal effect.29 Many thousands
of same-sex couples in fact did this before it became possible for such
couples to get a legal marriage in this country.30
ing the ‘expression[ ] of emotional support and public commitment.’”); Walker, 986 F.
Supp. 2d at 987. See also Rosenblum Statement, supra note 18 (“Marriage is the way that
loving couples become family to each other. . .”).
25. See, e.g., BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 24-25, 120-21 (describing Olson dodg-
ing questions by Judge Walker aimed at establishing this distinction),172-73, 177 (asserting
that “marriage” is “essential to the enjoyment of life”); Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks,
Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 7 (2009) (contending that “marriage” predated the state, without
acknowledging this could only possibly be true of social marriage, not marriage as a legal
status).
26. DeBoer Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 5, 23.
27. Bourke Amicus 1, supra note 18, at 3.
28. Clergy in North Carolina have filed a complaint in federal court alleging that state
criminal statutes prohibiting persons authorized to solemnize a marriage to “perform a
ceremony of marriage between a man and woman” or to “marr[y] any couple without a
license” violate their First Amendment rights, by preventing them from performing wed-
dings for same-sex couples. Complaint, Hoffman v. Cooper, Case 3:14-cv-00213-RJC-DCK
(filed Apr. 28, 2014). The sensible reading of these statutes is that they prohibit perform-
ance of a ceremony intended to have legal effect, and the Complaint suggests that is what
the clergy want to do, not merely to have a private, non-legal ceremony.
29. The Ninth Circuit’s entertaining soliloquy on the significance of the marriage label
was thus misplaced. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012). Gay and
lesbian couples have always been free to make marriage proposals, on bended knee or by
billboard, and to talk about themselves as married with family and friends. The only accu-
rate points the court made were that same-sex couples, under California’s registered part-
nership law, would have had to check “registered partnership” rather than “married” on
government forms and would have had to say “became registered partners” rather than
“married” if they chose to publicize their commitment ceremony in the newspaper and if
they worried about someone charging them with committing fraud. Id.
30. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACK-
LASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 22 (2012).
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Same-sex couples have also always been legally free to tell any children
they have that they are “married.” Such speech would not fit any state’s
definition of maltreatment, and the First Amendment would preclude the
state from attempting to stifle it. Thus, public celebration and self-repre-
sentation to children, two things advocates for same-sex marriage cite as
reasons why legal marriage is important for them,31 in fact are not at
stake in the battle over same-sex legal-marriage. What messages children
receive from the social world outside their home is also significant, but a
separate matter.
Having a wedding but not being legally permitted to live together is, of
course, unsatisfying for any couple. Legal marriage was once a legal pre-
condition for any couple, opposite-sex or same-sex, to live together and
to be physically intimate. A major omission in scholarly and judicial con-
sideration of state interests has been the silence regarding state sex laws.
Historically, throughout the United States, states made it a crime for any-
one to have sex unless legally married. Wherever and whenever such laws
were on the books one could not legally have sex or “cohabit” with any-
one without the state’s permission in the form of a marriage certificate.32
For heterosexuals, that in turn meant they could not legally reproduce
and raise children together without getting legally married. Thus, legal
marriage historically was the door through which everyone had to pass
who wanted to “create a family,” a concept that traditionally has meant
procreating (adoption being a relatively recent phenomenon in the
United States).33 Denying a marriage license to a couple was therefore in
the past an infringement of a negative liberty, a right to the freedom to
fulfill basic human needs and desires.
And that, crucially, is why the Supreme Court, in the now-distant past,
characterized legal marriage as a matter of “fundamental liberty”: be-
cause it was the means by which the state controlled inter-personal inti-
macy. In recognizing either a substantive due process or an equal
protection constitutional right to legal marriage several decades ago, the
Supreme Court was really affirming a right to those underlying liberties—
that is, the freedom to form intimate unions and families. A piece of pa-
per from the state had no inherent meaning for couples or the Court; it
was the ability legally to carry on an intimate relationship, produce chil-
31. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae California Professors of Family Law in Support of
Respondents, Hollingsworth v. Perry, Sup. Ct. No. 12-144 (2013) (hereafter “Hollings-
worth Amicus”), at 7-8.
32. See Dubler, supra note 2, at 1168 (“For most of this country’s history. . . the choice
to live in an intimate relationship outside of marriage left consenting adults potentially
vulnerable to criminal prosecution.”).
33. Adoption became legally possible in the U.S. only in the mid-nineteenth century,
well after states first enacted marriage laws, and it became a common phenomenon only in
the latter half of the twentieth century. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HISTORY OF ADOPTION PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES, https://www.childwelfare.gov/
adoption/history.cfm (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (“The recent history of adoption in the
United States can be tracked to the 1850s, with the passage of the first “modern” adoption
law in Massachusetts that recognized adoption as a social and legal process”). Assisted
reproduction is, of course, and even more recent development in family formation.
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dren (if one wished), and share a household that was experientially im-
portant. The Court treated legal marriage as a constitutionally protected
right only because states made it a precondition for enjoying those other
rights to freedom in family life. States could have chosen voluntarily to
remove the precondition, by eliminating laws prohibiting non-marital in-
timacy and cohabitation, while also abolishing legal marriage, and no one
would have had a constitutional basis for complaining.
Thus, in Zablocki, the Court emphasized that the couple denied a mar-
riage license could not legally have an intimate relationship and live to-
gether absent a state-issued marriage certificate. Wisconsin had an anti-
fornication law making sex between unmarried people a crime. The Court
clearly rested the constitutional significance of a state marriage certificate
on its being a precondition for living together and procreating:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, child-
birth, child rearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this case
illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy
with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to
the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the
family in our society . . . . [I]f appellee’s right to procreate means
anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relation-
ship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to
take place.34
The right to marry piggybacked on the rights to cohabit and procreate;
it was a second-order right, indirectly a matter of negative liberty.
The Zablocki Court also cited precedents involving family law issues
other than restrictive marriage laws, cases in which it had likewise made
statements tying legal marriage to social marriage and family formation
(i.e., procreation and child rearing). The Court quoted Meyer v. Ne-
braska, a decision resolving a parent-state conflict over school regulation,
for the proposition that “the right ‘to marry, establish a home and bring
up children’ is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.”35 Notice the sequence there. This was a jurisprudential transla-
tion of the “first comes love, then comes marriage, then comes baby in
the baby carriage” ditty that many of us grew up hearing. More on that
below.
Lastly, the Zablocki Court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, holding un-
constitutional a state law prohibiting sale of contraceptives as applied to
married people,36 for the proposition that legal marriage serves the addi-
tional instrumental purpose of protecting a couple’s privacy and repro-
ductive autonomy—also inherently important things and also matters of
34. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
35. Id. at 384 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see also id. (citing
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (characterizing marriage as “the foundation of
the family) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage as
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”)).
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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negative liberty.37 That connection between legal marriage and privacy
entirely disappears if legal marriage is not a precondition for being legally
protected against state intrusion into one’s home and disruption of one’s
intimate and family life with the person of your choice.38 In fact, state
recognition per se is the opposite of privacy; its essence is public acknowl-
edgement and recording of an intimate relationship.
The instrumental importance a marriage certificate used to have was
more graphic in Loving v. Virginia.39 The state had actually enforced
background criminal prohibitions against a couple’s intimate relationship,
sentencing a black woman and white man to a year in jail for having gone
to another state to marry in defiance of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law.
To avoid serving that sentence, the couple had to move out of state. Had
they simply lived together as a couple in Virginia, without seeking legal
recognition of their relationship anywhere, they would have been subject
to prosecution for violating Virginia’s anti-fornication law.40 The Court in
Loving, as it did later in Zablocki, predicated the view that legal marriage
is a fundamental right on its being a precondition for something else of
inherent importance, stating: “The freedom to marry has long been rec-
ognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men” and “marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival,” citing Skinner v.
Oklahoma, which invalidated a sterilization law, as authority for that pro-
position.41 Neither the state-issued paper nor the material benefits that
attend legal marriage constituted the “happiness” to which the court re-
ferred, nor are they fundamental to a society’s survival; it is rather the
legal liberty to cohabit and reproduce that is such.
The Court’s most recent marriage decision, Turner v. Safley, reinforced
the connection between legal marriage and intimate relations. The Court
held that prisoners have a substantive due process right to legal marriage
despite their current forced separation from their intended spouses,
because
Many important attributes of marriage remain . . . after taking into
account the limitations imposed by prison life . . . . Third, most in-
37. 434 U.S. at 384-385 (“[A]mong the decisions that an individual may make without
unjustified government interference are personal decisions ‘relating to marriage; procrea-
tion; contraception; family relationships; and child rearing and education.”).
38. The Court later extended this right of privacy to non-marital couples in Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), announcing a “right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” This makes Zablocki’s
connection between the right to marry and privacy odd, but does not change the fact that
the Court relied in part on that connection to justify finding a right to marry. Also odd is
that lower courts did not read Eisenstadt as making anti-fornication laws unconstitutional.
Lawrence has served that purpose.
39. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
40. See VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (“Any person, not being married, who voluntarily
shall have sexual intercourse with any other person, shall be guilty of fornication, punisha-
ble as a Class 4 misdemeanor.”).
41. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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mates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and
therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that
they ultimately will be fully consummated.42
The Court thus assumed prisoners’ marrying was like deployed soldiers’
marrying; intimacy is not possible at the time, but should be in the future.
Further, the Court distinguished its prior decision in Butler v. Wilson,
which had upheld a state statute denying a particular group of prisoners
the possibility of legal marriage, based on two factual differences, one of
which was that the statute imposed “a prohibition on marriage only for
inmates sentenced to life imprisonment”—that is, prisoners who presum-
ably would never leave prison and cohabit with the person they wanted to
marry.43 The Court in Turner also included on its list of “important attrib-
utes of marriage” a couple’s “expressions of emotional support and pub-
lic commitment,” “exercise of religious faith,” and “receipt of
government benefits.”44 But as explained above, legal marriage actually
bears no relation to the first two of those three things; it is not necessary
to expressing anything or to having a clergy member visit you in prison
and perform a non-legal ceremony.
What legal, political, and academic advocates for same-sex marriage,
along with many judges now, have failed to acknowledge, though it
should be obvious to them, is that this constitutionally-crucial connection
between legal marriage and the basic freedom to live in intimacy with
another person has disappeared. The Supreme Court itself eliminated the
connection between legal marriage and the negative liberties that are im-
portant aspects of human experience, at least for same-sex couples. For
them, Lawrence destroyed the legal and factual foundation of the Court’s
earlier treatment of legal marriage as a “fundamental liberty” and trans-
formed legal marriage into merely a matter of positive right, a claim to
gratuitous state benefits. Today legal marriage bears no legal connection
whatsoever to “the right ‘to establish a home’” with the intimate partner
of your choice.
Justice Scalia therefore got it backwards when he suggested that the
holding in Lawrence leads inevitably to a ruling in favor of a constitu-
tional right to legal same-sex marriage.45 In fact, what Lawrence did was
to remove the foundation for ascribing a right to legal marriage to gays
42. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 78, 95-96 (1987). Chief among the many analytical
weaknesses of Turner is the Court’s failure even to consider the possibility that the state
could make prisoners wait to get married till after release. The possibility of conjugal visits
might explain this.
43. Id. at 96. The other difference was that “importantly, denial of the right was part of
the punishment for crime.” Id.
44. Id.
45. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority decision “dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned.”); see also Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229
(10th Cir. 2014) (likewise misperceiving the implication of Lawrence for the constitutional
significance of marriage).
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and lesbians. It established a constitutional right for them to be intimate,
live together, and create a family life without government interference,
regardless of their marital status.
It seems safe to assume the Court would extend the central principle of
Lawrence to opposite-sex couples and invalidate anti-fornication laws,
but it has not had occasion to do so, nor for the most part have lower
courts. One state court has held an anti-fornication law invalid based on
Lawrence.46 Such laws remain on the books of many other states,47
though, and are presumptively enforceable until a court says otherwise,
which technically could provide a basis for saying same-sex couples are
not similarly-situated to opposite-sex couples in that state (i.e., opposite-
sex couples need legal marriage in order to cohabit legally, whereas
same-sex couples do not). Incidentally, thinking about how a court should
analyze a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to anti-fornication laws
quickly reveals the genuineness of states’ concern about extramarital
pregnancies. A state defending its anti-fornication law would surely strive
to distinguish Lawrence on the ground that heterosexual sex imposes a
cost on the state that gay or lesbian sex does not—namely, unintended
extramarital pregnancies, which might lead either to abortion or depen-
dency on the state.
In any event, since 2003 any same-sex partners who wished to live to-
gether in an intimate relationship, as a family, have been legally free to
do so anywhere in the United States without a marriage certificate. Legal
marriage became no longer a precondition for their sexual relations, co-
habitation, or pursuit of happiness through family life.48 Accordingly, a
claim to have a fundamental right to legal marriage is today not a nega-
tive-rights claim for same-sex couples, but rather a positive-rights claim; it
is not a claim to be left alone but rather a demand to receive certain
gratuitous state benefits simply because other people are receiving them.
For that reason, Court doctrine dictates that the claim does not rest on a
fundamental right.
Before recital of that doctrine, note further that sexual minorities have
secured many other practical and symbolic benefits since Lawrence. Mas-
sachusetts opened legal marriage to same-sex couples in 2003,49 and be-
46. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005). Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F.
Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (invalidating on free exercise of religion grounds portion of
state anti-bigamy law prohibiting married persons from cohabitating with someone not
their spouse).
47. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (West 2014).
48. One exception is ability to raise a child by adopting in the few states where only
married couples can adopt and where same-sex marriage is not legally recognized. Second-
parent adoption by a same-sex partner is now possible in nearly half the states. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Parenting Laws: Second Parent or Stepparent Adoption, available at http://
hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/sec-
ond_parent_adoption_6-10-2014.pdf. Even where it is not, the partner of a legal parent can
continue to live with and act as caregiver to a child without having legal parent status, like
any heterosexual step-parent. In any event, if a state’s adoption laws create some problem
in a family, the parents can challenge the adoption laws directly.
49. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (2003).
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cause it has no residency requirement for couples wishing to marry, for
the past twelve years couples throughout the country have been able to
travel to Massachusetts and become legally married on a wedding vaca-
tion.50 Subsequently, legal marriage for same-sex couples has come to
many other states, including some that also have no residency require-
ment.51 So same-sex couples throughout the nation have increasingly
been able to secure a legal marriage per se without traveling far.52
That change was not completely satisfying, because a) same-sex
couples living in any state were not recognized as married by the federal
government, and b) couples in states without legal same-sex marriage
might not be recognized as married by their home state either. Thus,
many practical benefits and symbolic public acknowledgement dependent
on government recognition were still lacking. But then came Windsor,
establishing that the federal government must treat as married same-sex
couples whose home state grants them a marriage certificate, followed by
executive and agency decisions extending that federal recognition also to
couples who get legally married in a state other than their state of resi-
dence.53 Now every same-sex couple living anywhere in the United States
can not only get legally married and live together but can also enjoy sub-
stantial financial, practical, and symbolic benefits the federal government
bestows on married couples.
What remains, then, for the same-sex marriage movement to achieve?
What is actually at stake for couples in states whose laws are the subject
of federal cases now before the Supreme Court? It is just the practical
and symbolic benefits their home state itself bestows on legally married
people.54 Many of the practical benefits are ones that private parties, in-
cluding same-sex couples, can secure for themselves by executing docu-
ments, like any unmarried cohabitants—for example, probate and non-
probate transfers of wealth at death, a testamentary or standby guardian-
ship to ensure any children they are co-parenting will remain in the cus-
tody of the survivor if a sole legal parent dies,55 visiting privileges at
hospitals, proxy decision making power in case of incapacity, and finan-
cial arrangements following relationship dissolution.56 If there is any
50. See LGBT MASSACHUSETTS, STEP BY STEP GUIDE www.lgbtmassvacation.com/
marriage/step-by-step-guide/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
51. See, e.g., US MARRIAGE LAWS, http://usmarriagelaws.com/search/united_states/
maryland/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
52. Cf. Brock Vergakis, Virginia Prepares for Possibility of Gay Marriage, Associated
Press (Aug. 20, 2014), abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/virginia-prepares-possibility-gay-mar-
riage-25048229 (citing statement by Unitarian minister in Northern Virginia that most con-
gregants desiring same-sex marriage had already accomplished that in D.C. or Maryland).
53. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
54. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 352, 369, 372 (4th Cir. 2014) (listing as all
the consequences of not being married that one partner was denied access to the other in
the hospital for several hours, that one could not adopt the other’s child and instead had to
petition for joint legal and physical custody, and that they had to pay more in taxes).
55. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5202.
56. Cf. Devaney v. L’Esperance, 949 A.2d 743, 753-59 (N.J. 2008) (summarizing state
court decisions nationwide that enforce contracts between unmarried cohabitants).
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practical advantage of state recognition with respect to those benefits, it is
really just application of a default rule sparing couples from executing
documents and perhaps paying for a lawyer (though such documents are
readily available on the internet and simple to complete for most people).
Other benefits or advantages only the state can generate, such as a spe-
cial tax filing status (which is actually more likely to be a liability for
same-sex couples, as same-sex couples are more likely to contain two full-
time workers),57 state-mandated benefits for spouses of employees (also
valuable to a smaller percentage of same-sex couples, for the same rea-
son), tort remedies against third parties (rarely invoked), ability to for-
malize an existing social relationship with a child through step-parent
adoption (rarely possible when the other biological parent has legal par-
ent status, and increasingly possible for same-sex partners even without
marriage), or (in some states) to adopt jointly a child who is not the bio-
logical child of either partner (though this is not necessary in order for
both to live with the child), and whatever symbolic significance there is to
the state’s treating one the same as heterosexuals.
These remaining benefits are significant, and many individuals view
them as subjectively important. But there is no support in reason or Su-
preme Court doctrine for treating any of them, individually or collec-
tively, as a matter of fundamental right. Surely states could abolish legal
marriage altogether, if it is in fact no longer a precondition for any liber-
ties for anyone, and cease providing such benefits on the basis of relation-
ship status, as some scholars have urged.58 Indeed it would be
incongruous for the Court, after declining in Lawrence to declare that
same-sex couples have a “fundamental” right to sexual freedom and un-
disturbed privacy in their homes,59 to now say that people in such couples
have a fundamental right to special state-income-tax filing status and sur-
vivor benefits. State-conferred financial benefits have never been treated
in our legal system as a matter of fundamental constitutional right,60 nor
has been the ability to adopt a child. It is a policy choice for states
whether to provide them at all. They are not the sort of things one must
have in order “‘to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life.’”61 They are, again, not
57. See Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006).
58. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: AID FOR AFFLUENT HUS-
BAND CARE, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109 (2011) (criticizing the perverse distributional
effects of tax law relating to marriage); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106
MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (arguing more generally against family law’s over-privileging of
marriage and marriage-like relationships).
59. See Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[N]owhere in
Lawrence does the Court describe the right at issue in that case as a fundamental right or a
fundamental liberty interest”); Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235
(11th Cir. 2004) (“The Court has been presented with repeated opportunities to identify a
fundamental right to sexual privacy—and has invariably declined.”).
60. See Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976).
61. Schaefer, 760 F. 3d at 375 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851, (1992)).
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matters of negative liberty but rather gratuitous benefits. Accordingly,
substantive due process is today the wrong lens for anyone to claim a
right to legal marriage, and courts cannot justify applying heightened
equal protection scrutiny on the basis of the supposed importance of the
private interest at stake.
This becomes clearer when one considers what else the Supreme Court
has said is not a matter of fundamental right for due process or equal
protection purposes. In Deshaney v. Winnebago County, based on a ma-
jority opinion to which Justice Kennedy affixed his signature, the Court
held that a child in the custody of a state agency has no constitutional
right whatsoever against that state agency’s repeatedly placing him in the
unsupervised custody of a biological father the agency knew to be bru-
tally abusive. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia and four other Justices
in asserting, “[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to se-
cure life, liberty, or property interests.”62 Further: “Although the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwar-
ranted government interference . . . it does not confer an entitlement to
such [governmental aid] as may be necessary to realize all the advantages
of that freedom.”63 The Deshaney Court noted other types of government
benefits that it had held were not matters of constitutional right, such as
financial assistance in obtaining an abortion and shelter for the home-
less.64 In addition, sixteen years earlier, the Court had rejected the pro-
position that education is a matter of fundamental right for children,
stating that “the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause
this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State’s social
and economic legislation.”65 After denying the most vulnerable persons
in our society a right to state assistance in meeting the most basic human
needs, and even a right against being forced by state actors to live in a
dangerous environment, how could the Supreme Court today rationally
endorse the proposition that self-sufficient adult couples have a funda-
mental constitutional right to receive state acknowledgement of their inti-
mate relationship and attendant financial benefits and conveniences?
Express state recognition or validation of personhood or relationships
per se is also not something the Constitution guarantees us.66 The govern-
62. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980)) (no obligation to fund
abortions or other medical services); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, (1972) (no obliga-
tion to provide adequate housing). The Court also quoted from Youngberg v. Romeo: “As
a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border.”
65. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
66. See Michael Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meaning, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1274-75 (2011) (“Numerous Supreme Court cases, cutting
across doctrinal subject matter areas, treat mere labeling as presenting no cognizable con-
stitutional harm. . . . In addition, the government speech doctrine. . . gives the government
substantial leeway to express its own messages, even about the private exercise of constitu-
tional rights.”); id. at 1277 (“The law typically does not provide redress for expressive
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ment and its officials treat nearly everyone as less worthy in some ways at
some times. It might be upsetting when it happens to us, but it is not
unconstitutional simply because it might cause the disfavored to feel like
second-class citizens.67 Presidents invite celebrities and rich donors to the
White House, but not law professors whose work arguably is of greater
societal worth. Does that violate our constitutional rights? As a non-relig-
ious person, I feel like a second-class citizen when I witness or attend
governmental events that have religious trappings, but the Supreme
Court has told me such tradition-respecting practices violate no right of
mine so long as they are non-coercive.68 The state denies the driving priv-
ilege to many categories of people, defined by age, physical or mental
ability, and other characteristics, but we do not view that as making them
second-class citizens or infringing any fundamental right. Couples who
are childless might feel denigrated by official recognition of Mothers’
Day and Fathers’ Day, especially given that there is no “Spouses’ Day”
(itself telling of the state’s sensible priorities). Adoptive parents feel like
second-class parents because of the state’s strong protection of biological
parents, financial support for expensive assisted reproduction procedures,
and intense scrutiny of adoption applicants. The poor feel denigrated
when the state denies them welfare benefits, housing assistance, or a de-
cent education for their children.
Further, the government issues explicit negative statements about ac-
tivities like smoking and unhealthy eating that could make people who
engage in such activities feel like second-class citizens, and it explicitly
encourages other behaviors like staying in school, which could stigmatize
those who fail to engage in that behavior.69 Michael Dorf explains: “Be-
harms”). Dorf contends there is some doctrinal support for treating dignitary harm as con-
stitutionally significant, but provides no support for this except statements by conservative
Justices in affirmative action cases that he thinks place weight on the “social meaning” of
characteristic-based discrimination, and those statements in fact make no reference to so-
cial meaning or dignity or any synonym for either. See id. at 1295-97. Dorf also contends
several Supreme Court decisions have rested on a finding of animus; id. at 1297; but in fact
mention of animus was analytically superfluous in all those cases. Dorf’s ultimate thesis
that denying same-sex marriage is constitutionally problematic because it signals that peo-
ple in same-sex relationships are second-class citizens and forces them to “participate in
their own oppression” by indicating that they are single when dealing with governmental
or private institutions rests on an implicit assumption that single people are second-class
citizens; id. at 1308-09; an implausible assumption which he provides no support. It also
rests on an assumption that sexual minorities “reasonably understand those laws as brand-
ing them and their relationships as second-class;” id. at 1344; but never explains what
makes a group’s view or understanding of a law reasonable.
67. See id. at 1280 (“A citizen may be genuinely distressed about any number of ac-
tions the government takes or fails to take. . . Yet standing doctrine. . . asserts that the
citizen in such circumstances is not ‘injured’. . .[or] that certain sorts of real injury. . .
cannot be treated as real by the courts without licensing a litigation explosion”).
68. See, e.g., Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (upholding
town’s practice of having volunteer chaplains open each legislative session with a prayer).
See also Dorf, supra note 66, at 1290 (“Notably, the successful plaintiffs in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette only earned a right to opt out of participating in the
flag salute.”).
69. See Dorf, supra note 66, at 1286, 1291, 1339 n.210 (citing complaints among smok-
ers and the obese about feeling like second-class citizens).
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ing incidentally insulted or otherwise harmed by government speech . . . is
just part of the price each of us potentially pays for having an effective
government.”70 And, one might add, it is part of the price of living in an
imperfect world with sometimes insensitive fellow human beings.
It would be foolish for courts to start viewing these everyday state dis-
criminations and implicit slights as infringements of fundamental right,
even if some group makes denial of some particular state benefit a sym-
bolic battleground, working themselves up into the belief that unless they
have victory on that front they can never feel accepted as equal citizens.
It would be foolish because it would create this moral hazard, that people
could secure a stronger constitutional position by fomenting feelings of
inferiority, or fabricating displays of such, among group members.71 De-
fenders of religious trappings in government accuse the secularists who
bring Establishment Clause challenge of doing these very things.
It would be foolish also because it is impossible to make most laws
entirely non-discriminatory and non-exclusionary. Responding to one
group’s complaints of insult by adding them to a benefit program will
inevitably generate fresh insult among members of some other group that
remains excluded. If the Supreme Court holds that states must extend
legal marriage to same-sex couples, will this not increase the subjective
perception of state disparagement among polygamists, amorous siblings,
and religious groups that endorse child marriage? Will the Court have to
mandate legal plural marriage if polygamists claim to feel like second-
class citizens because the state denigrates their relationship choices? In-
deed, some scholars and advocacy groups complain that state glorification
of marriage itself makes single heterosexuals feel denigrated,72 especially
since single people are taxed to pay for the state-provided benefits mar-
ried people receive,73 and the same-sex marriage movement can only
have intensified singles’ feeling of social inferiority. Do single people
therefore have a presumptive constitutional right to abolition of legal
marriage?
Finally, to the extent any particular state benefit now tied to marriage
is important to the lived experience of same-sex couples, they are free to
challenge the denial of that benefit directly, arguing that it violates their
rights for the state to make it dependent on a marital status they cannot
obtain. That is what Lawrence was, a challenge not to denial of a mar-
riage certificate that might have indirectly secured the right of intimate
association for same-sex couples, but a successful challenge directly to the
invasion of privacy. Likewise, some couples have directly and successfully
challenged denial of the opportunity for one member of the couple to
70. Id.
71. Cf. BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 128 (relating Perry litigation plaintiff stating
that not having legal “marriage,” rather than registered partnership, created feelings
merely of “awkwardness” when opening a bank account or checking into a hotel).
72. See, e.g., Rosenbury, supra note 58.
73. Motro, supra note 57; UNMARRIED EQUALITY, Federal Income Taxes, /www.un-
married.org/federal-income-taxes.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
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adopt the legal child of the other.74 An irony of DeBoer v. Snyder is that
the couple involved initially challenged only the adoption law in Michi-
gan,75 but the federal trial court judge suggested they add a challenge to
the state’s marriage law!76 Unsurprisingly, the judge then held the state
marriage law unconstitutional.77
In sum, it is wrong for gay-rights advocates, political sympathizers,
judges, and family law professors to simplistically cite Zablocki and Lov-
ing for the proposition that legal marriage is a fundamental right, as they
routinely do. Too much has changed in the past quarter century, such that
what remains at stake is simply not the stuff of fundamental rights. And
they must all know this; I assume other family law professors also draw
their students’ attention to it.78 Yet in the stream of federal court mar-
riage decisions since Windsor, no court, amicus brief filed by legal aca-
demics, or statement by attorneys general declining to defend their states’
laws has acknowledged the dramatic changes Lawrence and Windsor
brought about in the legal and practical situation of same-sex couples.
This has been so even though this kind of analysis—that is, as to
whether prior assumptions or holdings of the Supreme Court remain au-
thoritative—is a familiar one for courts, lawyers, and legal scholars. In-
deed, it has featured in Lawrence and its progeny to answer two other
questions: in Lawrence, whether certain premises of Bowers v. Hardwick
remained true,79 and in the recent marriage cases whether the Supreme
Court’s decision in Baker v. Nelson80 should control the outcome. In
Baker, the Court summarily dismissed, “for want of a substantial federal
question,” an appeal from a Minnesota state court decision rejecting a
constitutional challenge to that state’s exclusion of same-sex couples from
legal marriage. The opinion of the federal district court in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, exemplifies lower courts’ handling of that precedent:
There is no dispute that such summary dispositions are considered
precedential and binding on lower courts. There is also no dispute
asserted that questions presented in Baker are similar to the ques-
tions presented here . . . . However, summary dispositions may lose
74. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Doe, 326 P.3d 347 (Idaho 2014).
75. See DeBoer Cert. Petition, supra note 18, at 8.
76. See Christine Ferretti, Judge to rule on adoption fight, THE DETROIT NEWS, Aug.
30, 2012 (“On January 23, 2012, a lesbian couple filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan on behalf of themselves and three children, challenging
the state’s ban on adoption by same-sex couples so they can jointly adopt their children. . . .
In August 2012, Judge Bernard A. Friedman invited the couple to amend their suit to
challenge the state’s ban on same-sex marriage, “the underlying issue”).
77. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
78. Cf. Abrams & Brooks, supra note 25, at 19 (“Lawrence can be read as the nail in
the coffin of Zablocki. . . Lawrence challenges the idea that marriage can be a proxy for
legal sex, and strengthens the notion that constitutional privacy rights concern not the rela-
tionship of marriage but instead the sexual autonomy to enter into many kinds of
relationships.”).
79. See Brief for Petitioner, Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 WL 152352, at 30-32; Brief Ami-
cus Curiae of the ACLU in Support of Petitioner, Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 WL 164132, at
27-28.
80. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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their precedential value. They are no longer binding “when doctrinal
developments indicate otherwise.” This Court concludes that doctri-
nal developments since 1971 compel the conclusion that Baker is no
longer binding . . . . In so holding, the Second Circuit relied upon
doctrinal developments from Supreme Court decisions, including
cases creating the term “intermediate scrutiny”; discussing classifica-
tions based on sex and illegitimacy; and finding no rational basis for
“a classification of [homosexuals] undertaken for its own sake” in
Romer v. Evans (1996).81
Treatment of legal marriage as a “fundamental liberty” in Zablocki and
Loving was not a holding but a premise. The lower federal court should
have concluded that the premise is no longer true, because legal develop-
ments in the past fifteen years have erased the legal connection between
marriage and personal autonomy in relation to family life that was ex-
plicit in and essential to the premise. Certainly legal scholars are free to
point this out. Yet no court or amicus brief filed by legal scholars has even
addressed this glaring reality. The Supreme Court, of course, is free to
establish now that legal marriage is no longer a matter of fundamental
right.
B. HOMOSEXUALS ARE, FORTUNATELY, NO LONGER
A SUSPECT CLASS
That the Movement’s successes have also undermined the case for la-
beling sexual minorities a “suspect class” is a possibility that has received
some scholarly attention. But the few judges and legal scholars who have
argued in favor of heightened review on this basis have completely ig-
nored the unprecedented political and popular ascendancy of the LGBT
community, strained to minimize it, or deployed an implausible standard
of powerlessness that would make every equal protection plaintiff group
a suspect class.82 None can plausibly be viewed as having addressed the
possibility objectively, because the gaps in their analyses are glaring.
Before explaining, it is worth noting a complexity with this aspect of
equal protection analysis in connection with same-sex marriage that has
gone unremarked. The group of persons who seek same-sex marriage is
81. Bostic v. Rainey, F.Supp. 2d 456, 469-70 (E.D. Va. 2014). See also Kitchen v. Her-
bert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1204-08 (10th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer 760 F.3d. 352, 372-73 (4th
Cir. 2014) (making similar analysis and citing other federal court decisions to the same
effect); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F.Supp.2d 982, 990 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
82. See, e.g., Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (“The question
is whether they have the strength to politically protect themselves from wrongful discrimi-
nation . . . . A more effective inquiry looks to the vulnerability of a class in the political
process due to its size or political or cultural history. Under this inquiry, Kentucky’s laws
against homosexual persons are ‘Exhibit A’ of this powerlessness.”(citations omitted)).
The first sentence here is circular, insofar as wrongfulness tends to turn on level of scrutiny.
I have no idea what it means to be “vulnerable. . . due to its . . . political or cultural
history.” If vulnerability arises simply from small size then the much-maligned “One Per-
cent” must deserve protected-class status. If the court were to respond with “but the One
Percent is not vulnerable,” then it would be confessing that size and history do no work in
its formulation.
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not limited to gays and lesbians—that is, people for whom there is no
reasonable alternative to pursuing a same-sex intimate relationship.
Bisexuals, who constitute 40% of the LGBT population,83 as well as
transgendered persons, complicate the very description of the class dis-
criminated against and the classification upon which the challenged dis-
crimination is based.84 Do traditional marriage laws discriminate against
bisexuals? If so, is bisexuality an immutable characteristic? Is there a his-
tory of widespread hostility against bisexuals per se? Is same-gender at-
traction an immutable characteristic if one can change one’s gender? Can
spiritual wives of polygamists complain that same-sex marriage laws are
over-inclusive with respect to the purpose of enabling everyone to marry
some person to whom they can be attracted, insofar as it sweeps in people
who (like them) realistically could make a more traditional choice and
people who (like them) could conform to traditional marriage expecta-
tions by altering an important aspect of their personal identity (gender
identity vs. religious belief)? Lawyers defending state laws might do well
to problematize the plaintiffs’ description of the class and the nature of
the discrimination.
It is also worth noting preliminarily the enormous odds against any
group seeking protected-class designation from the Supreme Court to-
day.85 The Court has a bad equal-protection hangover, as a result of com-
bining the Warren Court’s thirst for civil rights with the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts’ (highly selective) taste for abstraction, garnished with
bad timing. The Court gave this special protection to historically-subordi-
nated groups just as they were coming into their own politically, then
transformed the predicate for heightened review from discrimination
against those groups to discrimination against anyone (including the his-
torically super-ordinate group) on the basis of the group-defining charac-
teristic, thereby rendering presumptively invalid a large swath of state
action, and it has ended up most often using heightened review against
the historically-subordinate groups after they acquire sufficient political
power to secure corrective-justice legislation.86 In addition to struggling
with separation of powers discomfort and the affirmative action head-
83. See Pew Center Report, supra note 9, at 5.
84. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 353 (2000) (explaining why gays and lesbians have reason to hope bisexuals remain
invisible).
85. See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce
Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367,
385 (2014) (“For at least two decades, scholars have remarked on the Court’s reluctance to
create new suspect classes based on political process analysis. Two decades ago, however,
they could point to Cleburne as a relatively recent example of the Court at least engaging
in such analysis. From the current vantage point, what is remarkable is not so much the
Court’s unwillingness to create new suspect classes but its unwillingness even to consider
that possibility.”); DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 413 (noting that the Court “has not recognized a
new suspect class in more than four decades”).
86. See Sonu Bedi, Collapsing Suspect Class with Suspect Classification: Why Strict
Scrutiny Is Too Strict and Maybe Not Strict Enough, 47 GA. L. REV. 301, 307 (2013)
(“[B]etween 1990 and 2003, 73% of all laws that invoked race were struck down when
subjected to strict scrutiny in federal courts. The ‘overwhelming majority’ of laws struck
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ache, the Supreme Court now realizes it is very difficult to put a cork in
the suspect-class bottle after the potion sours; the Court has no procedure
or test for demoting a class or classification.
The LGBT community might therefore want to think twice before in-
sisting that the Court make sexual orientation (or should it be sexual
choice, to include bisexuals?) a suspect classification and ever thereafter
apply a presumption of invalidity to any law aimed at remediating this
society’s historical mistreatment of them. “Legitimate” children have not
yet sued the government for giving special benefits to children of single
parents, but whites and men have been successful in getting courts to pro-
hibit special benefits for racial minorities and women.87 If the Court adds
sexual orientation to the short list of suspect or quasi-suspect classes, in-
evitably some heterosexuals will challenge any government affirmative
action or special protections for sexual minorities they perceive as disfa-
voring heterosexuals. And they would likely succeed; sexual orientation-
blindness seems intuitively more feasible than race-blindness or gender-
blindness.
With respect to the substantive test, sexual minorities clearly satisfy
some criteria. Being gay or lesbian is immutable, and the history of legal
and societal prejudice and brutality toward gays, lesbians, and trans-
gendered persons is tragic.88 One of the many reasons I believe states
should confer legal marriage status on same-sex couples is that we as a
society should do as much as we can to demonstrate that we acknowledge
this history and its vestiges in the present, that we are collectively
ashamed of and regretful about it, and that we want sexual orientation
minorities now universally to feel and actually be fully accepted as equal
citizens, valued as good human beings, and safe at home and in public.
Legal marriage has lost most of its practical significance, but the LGBT
community is saying this is what it wants as validation of their equality, so
it is an effective way for the rest of us to communicate to them our regret
for the past and our resolve to overcome it.
Political power, though, is the factor most closely tied to the basic pur-
pose of heightened judicial review, to protect groups so disempowered
and isolated by pervasive hostility or denigration as to be unable to en-
sure that their interests receive proportionate consideration in the politi-
down in that period were those that sought to ameliorate the status of racial minorities,
such as affirmative action policies.”).
87. See Mark S. Kende, Is Bakke Now Super-Precedent and Does It Matter? The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Updated Constitutional Approach to Affirmative Action in Fisher, 16 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY15, 18-19 (2013) (describing string of cases in
which the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate race-based affirmative action
measures, such as favoring black teachers with less seniority over white teachers during
layoffs, minority set-asides in government contracting rules, and extra points for being of
minority race in college admissions decision making).
88. See Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars Ash Bhagwat et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-
4178)2014 WL 897511, at *10-14 [hereinafter Constitutional Amicus].
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cal process, rather than being treated with indifference.89 It is the one
factor that would enable courts to refuse requests for heightened review
by groups that might have needed it fifty or one hundred years ago but
not today. Ranked by this measure, there are other groups far more de-
serving of suspect class status that do not receive it—for example, chil-
dren, the disabled, and atheists.90
In the substantive due process context, it can actually help plaintiffs
that the tide of public opinion has turned in their favor, because of the
substantive rules applicable.91 And so in briefing Lawrence a dozen years
ago, those advancing gay rights maintained, even then, that “the Nation
has steadily moved toward rejecting second-class-citizen status for gay
and lesbian Americans”92 and that “[p]ublic policy toward gay men and
lesbians has changed dramatically over the past few decades.”93 Yet 2003
now seems like the Dark Ages in terms of public attitudes toward gays
and lesbians. The growth of public support for gay rights, including gay
marriage, since then, has been simply extraordinary,94 beyond what any-
89. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (“[O]ne aspect
of the judiciary’s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect ‘discrete and insular
minorities’ from majoritarian prejudice or indifference.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
“Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class
Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 981 (2014) (stating that the argument by proponents of
same-sex marriage to downplay the political power factor “ignores a fundamental justifica-
tion for the suspect class doctrine: to correct political process failures”). Attempts by schol-
ars and judges to minimize the significance of this factor typically point to Supreme Court
decisions issued well after a group was initially designated suspect or quasi-suspect, in
which the Court continued to apply the classification despite changes in the political power
of the group in question, including cases in which the Court applied heightened scrutiny to
affirmative action laws. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Re-
quirement for Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 11-12 (2010).
But the best explanation for this phenomenon, and the only explanation in affirmative
action cases, is that these designations take on a life of their own once made, the Supreme
Court having failed to develop any rational way of undoing or cabining them.
90. Cf. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (apply-
ing rational basis review after declining to ascribe suspect or quasi-supsect class status to
the mentally disabled); Stephen Losey, Group: Airman Denied Reenlistment for Refusing
To Say “So Help Me God”, AIR FORCE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://
archive.airforcetimes.com.article.20140904/NEWS05/309040066/Group-Airman-denied-
reenlistment-refusing-say-help-me-God. One offensive thing that otherwise highly admira-
ble defenders of gay rights have said is that homosexuals are the last group in our society
to suffer systematic discrimination. See, e.g., BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 8 (referring
to discrimination based on sexual orientation as “this last major bastion of institutionalized
discrimination in America”); id. at 33 (“But at the end of the twentieth century, with lim-
ited exceptions based on gender, there was only one group of American citizens that con-
tinued to suffer systematic discrimination at the hands of their own government . . . .”).
91. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-74 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002) (discussing state law developments concerning execution of men-
tally disabled criminals). It also helps because of judicial reluctance to get ahead of public
opinion, which is also true in the equal protection context.
92. Brief of Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), WL
152352, at *30-31.
93. Amicus Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al. in Support of Petitioners, Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558(2003) (No. 02-102) WL 152347, at *21 [hereinafter Lawrence
Amicus Brief].
94. See, e.g., BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that, in 2012, “the tide of
public opinion was continuing to change rapidly”); id. at 272 (noting a “change in attitudes
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one then dreamed possible. Though it remains difficult in many places in
the United States for gays and lesbians to be open about their sexuality, it
is undeniable that nationally they have tremendous political power and
public support for a group so small in number.95 Gays and lesbians have
been securing political victories on many issues in many states and at the
federal level for many years now, including anti-discrimination protec-
tions in employment and housing96 and eligibility to adopt children.97 Ten
states and the District of Columbia adopted same-sex marriage by popu-
lar will, without judicial compulsion,98 and others would undoubtedly
have followed if the litigation stampede had not paralyzed political ef-
forts.99 Thus, in dozens of states (when one includes anti-discrimination
laws as well as same-sex marriage laws), more than fifty percent of legis-
lators or voters have endorsed legal reform solely for the sake of a group
constituting (nationally) a very small percentage of the population.100
What other historically-subordinated group of similar size can claim such
political influence?
Also very telling is that polls now show super-majoritarian support for
that has swept the nation”); id. at 293-94 (“What was a ‘wedge’ issue in the 2004 presiden-
tial election is now, just ten years later, becoming widely accepted by the public and politi-
cians alike.”); id. at 294 (“[P]rejudice toward gays and lesbians is melting away in all walks
of life.”).
95. Cf. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443 (“The distinctive legislative response, both national
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they
have unique problems, but also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties
in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for
more intrusive oversight by the judiciary.”).
96. Lawrence Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 9, 19-22.
97. See id. at 26-27; see also Morgan Little, Gay Marriage Movement Wins Significant
Victories in 2013, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/
nationhow/19-pn-gay-marriage-movement-gains-2013-20131206-story.html.
98. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx. The Constitutional
Amicus attempts to minimize the significance of this by characterizing the legislative victo-
ries as “a modicum of success in select jurisdictions,” quite an understatement. They also
emphasize that “in some instances hard-fought gains in the battle for equal rights for gay
men and lesbians have been rolled back by aggressive ballot initiatives,” but they do not
identify any instances in which that occurred after legislative victories rather than court
mandates. Constitutional Amicus, supra note 88, at 20.
99. See Marriage and Family on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Mar-
riage_and_family_on_the_ballot (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
100. What that percentage is continues to be a subject of intense debate, mostly be-
cause oppression and stigma can deter people from acknowledging their sexual orientation.
A recent study found gays and lesbians make up 1.6% of the population, 0.7% for bisexu-
als, and 1.1% of surveyed persons considered themselves “something else.” See Brian W.
Ward et al., Sexual Orientation and Health Among U.S. Adults: National Health Interview
Survey 2013, 77 NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., July 15, 2014, at 3, available at http://cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr077.pdf. Even if one assumes the study undercounted both groups by a
third, and even if one treats the entire LGBT population as the relevant group, rather than
just gays and lesbians, the group whose political power is being measured amounts to
roughly five percent of the population. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Gary J. Gates in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees & Affirmance, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir.
June 16, 2014), 2014 WL 2800888, at *7 (stating that 8 million Americans identify as
LGBT).
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same-sex marriage nationwide101 and for decades have shown even
greater support for legal protections for sexual minorities against employ-
ment discrimination.102 These are impressive public relations successes
that advocates for a litigation solution, such as the Constitutional Law
amici, studiously avoid mentioning.103 Even in states where the Move-
ment has not yet secured legislative reform, the percentage of residents
supporting same-sex marriage far exceeds the percentage of the popula-
tion that stands to benefit from it.104 And even in some conservative
southern states, attorneys general, who always have a keen eye on the
governor’s mansion and therefore on public opinion, refused to defend
traditional marriage laws in litigation.105 The president of the United
States reversed his initial position and came out in support of same-sex
marriage,106 and more than half the members of both houses of Congress,
along with the governors of some of the most populous states, are now on
board.107
Then there is the wealth behind the movement. A large number of very
rich and powerful people and organizations have supported the same-sex
marriage cause,108 including many prominent conservatives.109 The cor-
porate world generally opposes anti-gay measures and supports same-sex
marriage in their states of operations, in part to ensure all potential em-
ployees view the state as welcoming.110 Gays and lesbians themselves as a
101. See Katherine Faulders, As Gay Marriage Turns 10, US Public Opinion Tips, ABC
NEWS (May 16, 2014, 3:36 PM) http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/05/as-gay-mar-
riage-turns-10-us-public-opinion-tips.
102. Scott Barclay & Daniel Chomsky, How Do Cause Lawyers Decide When and
Where to Litigate on Behalf of Their Cause?, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 595, 605 (2014) (“80
percent of the surveyed population supports ‘equal rights in terms of job opportunities’ by
April 1993 and the level of support continues to climb throughout the next decade.”).
103. See, e.g., Constitutional Amicus, supra note 88, at 17-24 (discussing legislative ac-
tion but making no mention of popular support as measured by polls).
104. See, e.g., Missouri, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/
entry/c/missouri (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (estimating “4.4 same-sex couples per 1,000
households” in Missouri, but 33% of the entire state population supporting same-sex mar-
riage and 31% supporting civil unions); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 368 (4th Cir. 2014)
(stating that 43% of Virginia voters voted against the Marshall/Newman Amendment in
2006).
105. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, Kentucky Law Official Will Not Defend Ban on Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 5, 2014, at A17; Alexander T. MacDonald, Virginia AG’s Con-
troversial Decision Not to Defend Same-Sex Marriage Ban May Herald a New Day for
Same-Sex Couples in the Commonwealth, 30 DOCKET CALL 3-4 (2014), available at http://
www.vsb.org/docs/conference/young-lawyers/dc_spr2014.pdf.
106. Cf. BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 222 (noting the “dramatic shift” in the fed-
eral government’s position on gay rights).
107. See Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 12, at 457 (“By the time the Supreme Court heard
oral arguments on DOMA and Proposition 8, fifty-four senators, 180 members of the
House of Representatives, fifteen governors, and at least 117 mayors had declared them-
selves in favor of marriage equality.”); id. at 462 (noting the support of Governor Cuomo
of New York).
108. BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 47-67 (describing assemblage of support from
celebrities, wealthy donors, major law firms); id. at 222-23 (noting over 100 large corpora-
tions signed on to amicus briefs supporting same-sex marriage).
109. Id. at 223.
110. See, e.g., Nick Halter, Target Files Court Papers Supporting Same–Sex Marriage in
Wisconsin and Indiana, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Aug. 5, 2014, 3:41 PM), www
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group, unlike racial minorities and women, have above-average in-
comes.111 The amici support for the plaintiffs in the Perry litigation when
it reached the Supreme Court, including conservative organizations and
major American corporations, was overwhelming, perhaps unprece-
dented.112 Undoubtedly it is again now for “the final showdown.”
Representation in government depends on how it is measured. If by
the percentage of elected government officials who are “out” gays, lesbi-
ans, bisexuals, or transgender persons, then the LGBT community is still
under-represented, though by much less today than a couple of decades
ago and undoubtedly far less than for, for example, “out” atheists or, of
course, children.113 If measured in terms of elected officials “on one’s
side,” rather than hostile or merely neutral, the LGBT community is to-
day wonderfully over-represented. Arguably that has long been the case;
gay rights other than marriage were on the platform of the Democratic
National Committee (DNC) as early as 1980, and anti-discrimination laws
passed all over the nation in the 1970s reflected the gay community’s sub-
stantial “political clout” even then.114 More recently, support for same-
sex marriage per se has expanded dramatically among Democrats, as il-
lustrated by addition of same-sex marriage to the Democratic National
Committee party platform in 2012.115 It has also spilled over into the Re-
publican Party, with 40% supporting same-sex marriage.116 Indeed, it has
become difficult for anyone operating in mainstream society, and ex-
tremely difficult for any liberals, to stand on the sidelines, let alone to
oppose the Movement’s objectives or challenge the Movement’s argu-
ments.117 In the legal academy, this pressure is even more intense; no
untenured law professor with an ounce of self-preservation instinct would
.bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2014/08/05/target-amicus-same-sex-marriage-wisconsin-in-
diana.html.
111. See Blake Ellis, Gay People Earn More, Owe Less, CNN MONEY (Dec. 6, 2012,
1:37 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/06/pf/gay-money.
112. BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 22-23 (“In quantity and, far more important, in
quality, these briefs dwarfed the submissions supporting our opponents and left no doubt
that the tide of public opinion had shifted dramatically in favor of marriage equality.”)
113. See Stephanie McNeal, Unenforceable Ban on Atheists Holding Public Office Still
on the Books in 8 States, FOX NEWS (July 16, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/
07/16/states-athiests-banned/public-office.
114. See KLARMAN, supra note 30, at 23-25, 28.
115. Sam Stein, Democratic Party Platform: Pro-Gay Marriage, Immigration Reform,
Shots at Romney, Squishy on Guns, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2012, 10:51 PM), http://
www.huffinhgtonpost,com/2012/09/03/democratic-party-platform_n_1853120.html.
116. Polling Tracks Growing and Increasingly Diverse Support for the Freedom to
Marry, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/resources/entry/marriage-
polling (last updated July 2, 2014).
117. Cf. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1008 (D. Nev. 2012) (“[The political
success] the homosexual-rights lobby has achieved . . . indicates that the group has great
political power. . . . In 2012 America, anti-homosexual viewpoints are widely regarded as
uncouth. All in all, the political power of homosexuals has increased tremendously since
1990 when the High Tech Gays court ruled that the group did not, even then, sufficiently
lack political power for the purposes of an equal protection analysis.”); Dorf & Tarrow,
supra note 12, at 464 (relating a statement by a Movement leader suggesting that, even
within the LGBT community, an orthodoxy stifles discussion: “No one wanted to be seen
as against marriage equality and thus allied with the anti-gay-rights”).
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write an article like this one, challenging the liberal orthodoxy on same-
sex marriage.
Advocates for the Movement point to popular-vote reversals of past
victories,118 but the victories reversed were all judicial victories; changes
in public opinion have been steady in a positive direction. And with one
exception (North Carolina Amendment 1 in 2012, which did not reverse
anything), it has been five years since any statute or constitutional
amendment hostile to gay marriage has passed; all the political reversals
in recent years have been in favor of gay rights.119
This should not need to be pointed out,120 but simply not getting posi-
tive changes from legislators or ballot initiatives in some places at some
times cannot be sufficient to warrant suspect class treatment. The rele-
vant question is whether a group is able to ensure its interests receive
proportionate consideration in the political process, not whether its inter-
ests always win out over competing interests.121 We should expect groups
constituting a very small percentage of the population to fail most of the
time in attempting to get legislation benefiting just them passed.122 It is
fantastic that sexual minorities have won so much, disingenuous to deny
it, and arguably insulting to those who have worked tirelessly to change
public attitudes. In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court refused to
accord quasi-suspect class status to the mentally disabled:
The legislative response, which could hardly have occurred without
public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are po-
118. See Constitutional Amicus, supra note 88, at 5, 20.
119. See North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_Same_Sex_Marriage,_Amendment_1_(May_2012)
(last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
120. The Seventh Circuit tried to dismiss the political victories by suggesting they do
not reflect power but rather magnanimity on the part of the American public. This suggests
the voting patterns and disposition (negative as well as positive, presumably) of the major-
ity with regard to a minority group are irrelevant to gaging the group’s political power,
which makes one wonder on what basis Judge Posner could find that gays and lesbians are
or have ever been under-powered politically. Posner also draws a silly analogy to animals,
implicitly proffering the syllogism: “Any group for which legislatures have passed protec-
tive legislation are actually politically powerless if they do not have a vote. Animals do not
have a vote. Therefore, despite protective legislation, animals are politically powerless.”
Substituting “corporations” for “animals” in this syllogism reveals the implausibility of the
major premise. And, of course, members of the LGBT community do have a vote. Baskin
v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th Cir. 2014).
121. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (“If a plaintiff could necessarily win on the
political powerlessness factor of the level-of-scrutiny analysis by the very fact that he was
unable to challenge a particular law democratically, the factor would be meaningless. Polit-
ical powerlessness for the purpose of an equal protection analysis does not mean that the
members of a group have failed to achieve all of their goals . . . . The English suffix ‘-less’
means ‘without,’ and ‘powerless’ means ‘without power,’ not ‘without total power.’. . . The
question of ‘powerlessness’ under an equal protection analysis requires that the group’s
chances of democratic success be virtually hopeless, not simply that its path to success is
difficult or challenging because of democratic forces.”).
122. Thus, it is inapt to compare sexual minorities to women. When women, constitut-
ing 50% of the population, have had great difficulty securing legal protections through the
legislative process, then their political power must have been much less than their numbers
should have provided.
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litically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the
attention of the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be power-
less to assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and
social legislation would now be suspect.123
Moreover, the LGBT community’s political situation will clearly con-
tinue to improve, with overwhelming majority support now for all gay
rights among Americans under age 30.124 Even among evangelical Protes-
tants, there is substantial support for same-sex marriage in the younger
generations.125 Thus, every additional year that passes, even every month,
makes it even more inapt to treat them as a group in need of special
judicial protection in equal protection cases. Reliable statistical analyses
support a prediction that, within ten years, all states would legislatively
adopt legal same-sex marriage if left to make the decision themselves.126
This great and ongoing progress is something to be thankful for, and
something that should make a political victory nationally seem to the
Movement and the Supreme Court more likely and more worth waiting
for, an idea I return to in part IV.
Beyond considerations of political power, the Court would also con-
sider, if making a genuine effort to apply the established test, potential
relevance of sexual orientation to legitimate public policy.127 Yet advo-
cates and those posing as objective scholarly experts generally ignore this.
Space does not permit analyzing precisely when sexual orientation should
be relevant, but a few minutes’ thought brings to mind the following list
of government decisions as to which many people might think sexual ori-
entation is relevant:
• paternity and maternity presumptions
• foster care placement and adoption (could be pro or con, depending
on the child)
• child custody and visitation128
• whether to require health insurance companies to pay for childbear-
ing-related expenses or sex-reassignment surgery
• policies relating to contraceptives
• whether, how, and to whom public schools teach sex education
• design of locker rooms in schools or other public sports facilities
123. City of Cleburne, Tex v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
124. See KLARMAN, supra note 30, at 199.
125. Id.
126. See id., at 202; see also id. at 193-203 (describing the inevitability, if current trends
continue, of a political victory for the Movement).
127. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42 (“[W]here individuals in the group affected by a
law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to
implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system
and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as
to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the
Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.”).
128. See, e.g., A.O.V. v. J.R.V., No. 0219-06-04 2007 WL 581871, at *5-6 (Va. Ct. App.
Feb. 27, 2007) (upholding visitation restrictions aimed at limiting children’s exposure to
father’s homosexual lifestyle).
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• training of school counselors
• after-school clubs
• construction of public restrooms
• assignment of police and security officers to frisking duty
• prison housing and security
Even among the large portion of the American population that now
says sexual orientation should be irrelevant to the opportunity for legal
marriage, it might be that most would say sexual orientation is relevant to
many of these things. As to some, sexual minorities themselves might ask
to be treated differently or to be accommodated in some way.
II. SAVED BY SYMBOLIC SETBACKS?
Some suggest “animus” plays a role in equal protection analysis,129 pri-
marily because Justice Kennedy mentioned it in Romer and Windsor.
Whether it actually has constitutional significance is uncertain, which
helps explain why most lower federal courts have eschewed animus anal-
ysis.130 A straightforward reading of cases in which the Court has men-
tioned it should lead to the conclusion that it is analytically superfluous,
an inference the Court draws after already concluding that the law in
question serves no legitimate state interest.131 That the Court has never
provided guidance on what exactly animus is, how to identify it, or whose
feelings matter further supports an assumption that talk of animus is irrel-
evant finger-wagging. Kenji Yoshino argues, though, that even when the
Court says it is applying rational basis review, if it perceives animus, its
129. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F.Supp.3d 1144, 1163-64 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Bourke
Amicus 1, supra note 18, at 5, 28; Rainey Memorandum, supra note 18, at 12-13. Some
present a strawman argument that “[a] desire to mark same-sex couples as less worthy of
respect is an insufficient interest to sustain a law.” Brief of Amici Curiae Joan Heifetz
Hollinger et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, Kitchen v. Herbert 755
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4178), 2014 WL 991256, at *4 [hereinafter Kitchen Ami-
cus]; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The Constitution’s
guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”). No gov-
ernment official has ever claimed a state interest in expressing hostility to gays and lesbians
as justification for a marriage ban.
130. See Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., concur-
ring) (stating that most other courts have not relied on “animus doctrine”).
131. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect . . . .”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996) (inferring from the absence of any “rational relationship to legitimate state inter-
ests” that the challenged state constitutional provision was inexplicable on any grounds but
animus); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (“Because in our view the record does not reveal any
rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the
city’s legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance
invalid as applied in this case.”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35
(1973) (finding a discriminatory law unconstitutional only after considering all proffered
state purposes and finding them devoid of connection to the challenged classification). Cf.
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 410 (stating that Cleburne and Romer “turn on asking whether any-
thing but prejudice to the affected class could explain the law”).
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treatment of states’ arguments is actually less deferential.132 If that is
right and if it made a difference when the Court decides the same-sex
marriage issue, the DOMA movement will prove to be a massive blunder
by its promoters, but it should not make a difference.133 Let me explain:
State law obstacles to legal same-sex marriage actually take many
forms. They include not only 1) long-standing state statutes that explicitly
or by implication limit issuance of state marriage certificates to opposite-
couples, which this Article addresses. They also include: 2) state constitu-
tional amendments precluding legislative decisions to extend legal mar-
riage to same-sex couples, 3) statutory or constitutional prohibitions
against recognizing same-sex marriages secured in another state, and 4)
recent DOMA statutes that clarify the opposite-sex limitation of states’
original marriage laws.
Courts generally lump these all together.134 That is not problematic if it
does not muddle the analysis and if a court ultimately decides the core
issue in favor of sexual minorities—that is, that states must issue them
marriage certificates. For then the other laws, a fortiori, fall as well. But if
a court were to disaggregate them and address one at a time, the constitu-
tional analysis should be different for each such type of law. In particular,
the Supreme Court could conclude that same-sex couples do not have a
constitutional right to legal marriage, or somehow put off that issue till
another term, yet now invalidate any state constitutional provisions pre-
cluding legislative amendment to marriage statues. The Court could do so
on the grounds that the latter deprives sexual minorities of a previously-
enjoyed, political right—that is, a right to secure benefits by ordinary leg-
islation, in a way similar to the Colorado constitutional provision the
Court invalidated in Romer v. Evans.135 Notably, if the Court did that, it
would reaffirm majoritarian, democratic decision-making as the appropri-
ate means by which this change to marriage laws should occur, whereas
invalidating statutory limitations on state marriage licenses sends the op-
posite message.
In addition, the Court could decline to order reluctant states to issue
marriage certificates themselves, but invalidate state laws refusing inter-
132. Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage Restrictions Under Ra-
tional-Basis Review, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 23, 2011, 8:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2011/08/why-the-court-can-strike-down-marriage-restrictions-under-rational-basis-review/.
133. In addition to the explanation below of why no animus can be attributed, there is
also the fact that the bite animus might trigger would not make a difference. If it entails an
unwillingness to search for a state interest, that matters not, for the relevant state interest is
right before the judges’ noses, if only they could perceive it correctly. If the bite means
requiring a somewhat important interest, preventing non-marital pregnancy fits the bill.
And if it means the Court might expect the state to find alternative means of promoting
that end, the Court will be hard-pressed to suggest one, especially since it would likely say
states may not enforce anti-fornication laws.
134. See, e.g., Bishop, 760 F.3d, at 1078 (invalidating a state constitutional provision and
stating that this made statutory provisions the plaintiff failed to challenge nevertheless also
unenforceable). But see id. at 1110 (Kelly, J., dissenting in part) (stating “that cannot be
right”).
135. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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state recognition, based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause rather than
the Fourteenth Amendment. Refusal to recognize another state’s mar-
riage certificate does not make a couple “unmarried,” as advocates and
courts contend,136 any more than would be the case for a same-sex aca-
demic couple from Boston that chose to spend a sabbatical year living in
Russia. They would continue to be treated as legally married by the U.S.
government and by the state where they married regardless of where they
reside at a given point in time, and if they return to live in the conferring
state or relocate to a recognizing state they would immediately be treated
as legally married without having to go through the marriage process
again. However, refusal of inter-state recognition does deny a couple the
opportunity, so long as they choose to reside in the non-recognizing state,
to enjoy certain benefits that the non-recognizing state confers on other
married couples (as would be true if they traveled to certain foreign
countries). This is significant, and considerations of interstate comity and
the constitutional right of travel might alter the analysis.137 An interesting
possibility is that the Court could, by ordering states to recognize but not
confer, effect a sort of compromise, ensuring that same-sex couples
throughout the country can receive recognition from their own state’s
government (though possibly having to take a wedding vacation in an-
other state in order to accomplish that), but not forcing states to rewrite
their own marriage laws and change their own marriage licensing
practices.
The lumping together of the four types of laws has, however, some-
times distorted courts’ analysis, by leading to inaccurate attributions of
animus. What advocates, scholars, and judges generally fail to acknowl-
edge is that state statutory DOMAs saying marriage is a union of a man
and woman or that same-sex marriage is not permitted are really just
clarifications of long-standing state law.138 In Michigan, for example,
136. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014) (“ we agree with
the multiple district courts that have held that the fundamental right to marry necessarily
includes the right to remain married”); Jorge Rodriguez-Jimenez, Missouri’s First Same-
Sex Marriage Case In Court Today, Advocate.com (Sept. 25 2014) (quoting ACLU lawyer
challenging Missouri’s denial of inter-state recognition as asserting his clients are “effec-
tively divorced upon crossing that state line”).
137. But see DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 418-20 (rejecting such arguments).
138. See, e.g., Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1105-06 (Judge Holmes, concurring) (stating that
Oklahoma’s constitutional prohibition on issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
along with “parallel enactments, have only made explicit a tacit rule that until recently had
been universal and unquestioned for the entirety of our legal history as a country: that
same-sex unions cannot be sanctioned as marriages by the State. Even before the States
made the rule explicit, marriage laws that lacked express gender limitations had the same
force and effect as bans on same-sex marriage.”); id. at 1107 (“The Oklahoma law effectu-
ated no change at all to the status quo. . .”); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir.
2014) (“We do not dispute that states have refused to permit same-sex marriages for most
of our country’s history.”), 385 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“The Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia has always recognized that ‘marriage’ is based on the ‘mutual agreement of a man
and a woman to marry each other,’ Burke v. Shaver, 92 Va. 345 (1895).”); JAMES
SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE § 14, at 23 (1882) (explain-
ing that “the essentials of marriage” include that “the contracting parties should be two
persons of the opposite sexes”); JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
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“state law has defined marriage as a relationship between a man and a
woman since its territorial days.”139 Statutory DOMAs thus do not take
away anything that sexual minorities had before their enactment. They
are best viewed as superfluous rhetoric, with no practical import them-
selves. Invalidating and enjoining enforcement of those statutory provi-
sions because of any animus they reflect would therefore not, in and of
itself, produce the desired result; the Court would also have to invalidate
and order the rewriting of pre-DOMA statutes that reflect merely an un-
conscious presupposition that legal marriage is for opposite-sex couples.
Lower federal courts that have failed to appreciate this have actually
not given plaintiffs the relief they thought they were giving. For example,
in the Virginia litigation, the plaintiffs seemed to understand that they
needed to do more than invalidate Virginia’s constitutional and statutory
defense of marriage provisions.140 And the federal district court in Nor-
folk seemed to have understood this as it analyzed Virginia law.141 But
the district court’s ultimate order does not actually require Virginia to
issue marriage licenses and certificates to same-sex couples, because it
says nothing about Virginia’s pre-DOMA marriage law provisions.142
More importantly, no animus can be attributed to the underlying laws
that actually govern the issue. No one disputes that before states passed
these reactive bills, even where statutes did not explicitly limit marriage
to opposite-sex couples, legal marriage was unavailable to same-sex
couples; local clerks would have interpreted state law as precluding a
marriage license for any same-sex couple, and any court would have
found that perfectly consistent with legislative intent (or legislative un-
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE § 225 (1st ed. 1852) (“It has always . . . been deemed requisite to
the entire validity of every marriage. . . that the parties should be of different sex.”); Joseph
H. Beale et. al., Marriage and the Domicil, 44 HARV. L. REV. 501, 504 (1931) (“The law of
every common-law state, and indeed of every European and American state, deals with
marriage as a voluntary union of a man and a woman.”).
139. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 396 (citing 1 Laws of the Territory of Michigan 30-32 (1805
statute using the terms “wife” and “husband” and “man” and “woman”)). See also id. at
397 (“Early on, Kentucky defined marriage as “the union of a man and a woman.”) (citing
An Act for Regulating the Solemnization of Marriages § 1, 1798 Ky. Acts 49, 49–50), 398
(“Ohio also has long adhered to the traditional definition of marriage. See An Act Regu-
lating Marriages § 1, 1803 Ohio Laws 31, 31; Carmichael v. State, 12 Ohio St. 553, 560
(1861).”), 399 (“Tennessee has always defined marriage in traditional terms. See An Act
Concerning Marriages § 3 (1741), in Public Acts of the General Assembly of
North–Carolina and Tennessee 46, 46 (1815).”).
140. See Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 368 (“Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to challenge the con-
stitutionality of Virginia Code sections 20–45.2 and 20–45.3, the Marshall/Newman
Amendment, and ‘any other Virginia law that bars same-sex marriage. . .’ (collectively, the
Virginia Marriage Laws)”).
141. See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“The Court finds
Va. Const. Art. I, § 15–A, Va.Code §§ 20–45.2, 20–45.3, and any other Virginia law that
bars same-sex marriage . . . unconstitutional.”).
142. See id. at 484 (“The Court ENJOINS the Commonwealth from enforcing Sections
20–45.2 and 20–45.3 of the Virginia Code and Article I, § 15–A of the Virginia Constitu-
tion to the extent these laws prohibit a person from marrying another person of the same
gender.”).
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conscious assumption).143 And no one contends that any animus toward
sexual minorities attended states’ original enactment of opposite-sex-only
marriage laws.144 In Utah, the marriage law enacted at the inception of
statehood explicitly limited marriage to one man and one woman, to
make clear the impermissibility of polygamy rather than same-sex mar-
riage.145 Thus, if judges look at state marriage laws with a clear eye, they
should see that in order to compel a state to issue marriage licenses and
certificates to same-sex couples, they must examine states’ original mar-
riage laws on their own terms, laws reflecting merely unconscious as-
sumption rather than animus, and must find that they cannot pass true
rational basis review—that is, that these long-standing laws do not at all
serve a single legitimate state purpose as to which opposite-sex couples
and same-sex couples are differently situated.146 That is, unfortunately,
something judges cannot rationally do.147
III. OPPOSITE-SEX MARRIAGE STATUTES CLEARLY CAN
SURVIVE RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Because legal marriage cannot plausibly be characterized as a funda-
mental right today, and because homosexuals today are not a group that,
from a national perspective, needs special judicial protection against ordi-
nary democratic decision making, courts adjudicating constitutional chal-
143. Cf. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) (undertaking statutory interpreta-
tion exercise to establish that Hawaii law did at that time in fact authorize only opposite-
sex couples to marry even though it did not explicitly say that, noting: “The non-consan-
guinity requisite contained in HRS § 572–1(1) precludes marriages, inter alia, between
‘brother and sister,’ ‘uncle and niece,’ and ‘aunt and nephew[.]’ The anti-bigamy requisite
contained in HRS § 572–1(3) forbids a marriage between a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’ as the case
may be, who, at the time, has a living and ‘lawful wife . . . [or] husband[.]’ And the requi-
site, set forth in HRS § 572–1(7), requiring marriage ceremonies to be performed by state-
licensed persons or entities expressly speaks in terms of ‘the man and woman to be mar-
ried[.]’”); Defendants’ Reply Brief, in Deboer v. Snyder, 2014 WL 2994206 (C.A.6), 8
(“Over 150 years ago Michigan law went to the trouble of listing separately prohibitions on
men and women marrying close relatives, a step that would be unnecessary if gender did
not matter to marriage”).
144. Cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (“It seems fair to conclude that, until
recent years, many citizens had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the
same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman in
lawful marriage.”).
145. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-8 (West 2014).
146. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) does not dictate a different analysis. In Rog-
ers, the Supreme Court endorsed a district court finding of unconstitutionality as to an at-
large voting system that rested on a finding of discriminatory purpose in “maintaining” the
system. Rogers involved alleged race discrimination regarding voting rights, both of which
aspects generate the most rigorous judicial analysis. See United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). In addition, the distinction the Court drew can be read as
not between original purpose for creating and current purpose for continuing to use, but
rather between facial neutrality and disparate impact, a different distinction than that be-
tween traditional marriage law and modern DOMAs or between unconscious assumption
and animus.
147. If judges do not look at the statutory landscape with a clear eye, but rather treat
the relatively recent statutory DOMAs as the operative law, then proponents of those
DOMAs will ironically have actually made their states more vulnerable to same-sex mar-
riage rather than less.
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lenges to state marriage statutes cannot justify applying heightened
scrutiny. They also should not be adding undefined “bite” to rational ba-
sis review, given that traditional marriage laws reflect no animus, though
those laws would pass muster even so.148 Courts should assume that def-
erence to elected officials and the democratic process is appropriate, just
as they must with innumerable other kinds of laws that confer benefits on
some people and not others.149
But the pattern of federal litigation since Perry has been a model of
cause lawyering, starting with federal districts where drawing sympathetic
judges was most likely and the state executive was unlikely to defend
state law.150 Great momentum built before plaintiffs had to confront
more challenging judges. By the time cases reached the court of appeals
level, appellate judges would already have felt they were swimming
against the tide to reject the constitutional claim. This helps explain why
nearly all courts deciding these cases have been dismissive toward state
justifications. In fact, the lower federal court opinions show a striking
similarity to each other (Judge Posner’s Seventh Circuit opinion being the
clearest exception), suggesting judges inclined to decide in favor of the
Movement do not wrestle a great deal with the arguments on either side
but rather are in a hurry to show their support. So, too, with the liberal
family law academy.
A. ATTENTION PLEASE: THIS IS THE JUSTIFYING STATE INTEREST
One of the most startling portions of amicus briefs filed by liberal fam-
ily law professors in same-sex marriage cases is that in which they con-
tend legal marriage has nothing to do with procreation.151 These passages
have the quality of a Twilight Zone episode; we family law professors
have always taught our students the obvious truth that state marriage
laws (coupled with criminal anti-fornication laws) have long been in im-
portant part about preventing people not in a committed relationship
from accidentally conceiving a child, and that this purpose has only be-
come more compelling with the rise of the welfare state. Yes, legal mar-
riage has served and continues to serve many other purposes as well, but
that is irrelevant under any level of scrutiny.
In support of their remarkable denial of the connection between legal
marriage and procreation, these amicus briefs cite no historical authority,
and instead offer attempts at deductive inference that are, as shown be-
148. See supra note 135.
149. See Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
150. See BECKER, supra note 10, at Ch.1; BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 68-69.
151. See, e.g., Kitchen Amicus, supra note 129, at 6 (“Appellants’ suggestion that the
right to marry is inextricably intertwined with procreation is—in a word—wrong.”);
Bourke Amicus 2, supra note 18, at 28; Bourke Amicus 1, supra note 18, at 3 (stating that
arguments for limiting legal marriage to opposite-sex couples based on responsible procre-
ation “lack any basis in history, law, or logic”), 12 (“There is no historical or legal justifica-
tion to support Appellants’ claims that marriage has ‘always been linked to procreation’”).
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low, patently illogical.152 Moreover, they entirely omit from their briefs
reference to anti-fornication laws, language in Supreme Court precedents
reflecting the fact that legal marriage at the time constituted a license to
have sex and procreate, and the long-standing public discourse in this
country about how to reinforce with young people the idea that they
should avoid conceiving children until married (e.g., the ‘abstinence only’
vs. ‘safe sex’ debate surrounding sex education in schools).
This obfuscation by a significant fraction of the family law professoriate
might be part of the reason why federal court judges have misunderstood,
mischaracterized, or simply missed the point that legal marriage is in im-
portant part about forestalling procreation. Another part of the explana-
tion might be the apparent inability of most lawyers defending state
marriage laws (not themselves specialists in family law) to articulate the
point correctly. Perhaps common use of the word “channeling” to label
this state purpose misleads some people. Channeling suggests propelling
some already-existing thing forward into a new location, but the responsi-
ble-procreation thesis is not about propelling anything; it is rather about
preventing, stopping, or delaying something—namely, potentially procre-
ative sex.
The most common misunderstanding of the channeling function views
it as an aim of getting people who already have children, because of acci-
dental procreation, to get married to each other. For example, the Fourth
Circuit in Bostic wrote: “By sanctioning only opposite-sex marriages, the
Virginia Marriage Laws ‘provid[e] stability to the types of relationships
that result in unplanned pregnancies, thereby avoiding or diminishing the
negative outcomes often associated with unintended children.’”153 That is
not encouraging responsible procreation; it sounds more like responding
to irresponsible procreation that has already occurred. The Sixth Circuit
made the same mistake, writing: “By creating a status (marriage) and by
subsidizing it (e.g., with tax-filing privileges and deductions), the States
created an incentive for two people who procreate together to stay to-
gether for purposes of rearing offspring.”154 And the court failed to see
152. One of the signatories purported to offer historical counter-evidence to the re-
sponsible-procreation thesis in a recent article, but she completely misunderstands the the-
sis, believing it to be one about encouraging already married heterosexuals to produce
children. See Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1467, 1476 (2013) (“Responsible procreation posits that the government’s historic interest
in marriage is to single out and specially support ‘families that consist of, or potentially
could consist of, children and their biological married parents.’”), 1477 (mischaracterizing
the thesis as positing that “the alleged core, historic purpose of marriage [is to] to foster
and promote biological parenting”).
153. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014).
154. See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 405). See also id. at 422 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting)
(presenting a similar version of “the ‘irresponsible procreation’ theory: that limiting mar-
riage and its benefits to opposite-sex couples is rational, even necessary, to provide for
‘unintended offspring’ by channeling their biological procreators into the bonds of matri-
mony”); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (addressing “a ‘procreative channeling’
argument: that the norms of opposite-sex marriage ensure that as many children as possi-
ble are raised by their married biological mothers and fathers” because they “encourage
people in opposite-sex relationships to place their children’s interests above their own and
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that a purpose of keeping couples together after they already have chil-
dren fails to distinguish opposite-sex couples from same-sex couples.
The Tenth Circuit in Kitchen mischaracterized the state interest in a
different way, treating it as the proposition “that procreative couples
must be channeled into committed relationships in order to promote the
State’s interests in childbearing and optimal childrearing.”155 That is
about pushing people into marriage, which is quite different from dis-
couraging sex before an uncoerced decision to become married, and it is
about producing more children rather than less.
The Seventh Circuit’s characterization is bizarre. According to Judge
Posner, the supposed state interest is “to try to channel unintentionally
procreative sex into a legal regime in which the biological father is re-
quired to assume parental responsibility.”156 What is oddest about this is
that the law of parental responsibility—in particular, child support—
draws no distinction between married and unmarried fathers, as Judge
Posner must know. In addition, this statement is also about how to take
care of children after they accidentally come into existence, which is quite
different from preventing them from coming into existence in the first
place.
Let me begin, then, by making clear what the responsible-procreation
or “channeling” argument is not. First, it is not about encouraging the
biological parents of already-existing non-marital children to get legally
married to each other.157 To be sure, the state has historically tried to do
that as well.158 It still has some reason to do so, but pushing people into
marriage might be less sensible in an era when unhappy couples can so
easily dissolve it. In any event, that state aim is not the responsible-pro-
creation aim. And as courts have recognized, an aim of encouraging
couples who have already created a child to get married does not clearly
distinguish opposite-sex couples from same-sex couples. In fact, there is
arguably more reason to facilitate marrying for same-sex couples who
have intentionally become parents (and therefore presumably have al-
preserve intact family units”); id. (suggesting that the channeling aim is to increase “the
chance that accidental pregnancy will lead to marriage”). Scholarly supporters of same-sex
marriage also routinely mischaracterize the responsible-procreation aim in this way. See,
e.g., CARLOS BALL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN: A TALE OF HISTORY, SOCIAL
SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 5 (2014) (“The responsible procreation claim was centered around
the idea that the primary social function of marriage is to encourage those who conceive
children to take responsibility for them.”).
155. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1222 (10th Cir. 2014).
156. Baskin v. Bogan,766 F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2014). 2014 WL 4359059.
157. See, e.g., Baskin, 766 U.S. at 661 (“Encouraging marriage is . . . about enhancing
child welfare by encouraging parents to commit to a stable relationship in which they will
be raising the child together”), 656 (“To the extent that children are better off in families in
which the parents are married, they are better off whether they are raised by their biologi-
cal parents or by adoptive parents”); Hollingsworth Amicus, supra note 31, at 3; Rainey
Memorandum, supra note 18, at 12-13. This other aim might be what Abrams and Brooks
had in mind with the peculiar formulation: “a state’s interest in marriage is in tricking
heterosexuals into staying with each other.” Abrams & Brooks, supra note 25, at 32.
158. See generally Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2012)
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ready made a commitment to each other) than to facilitate marrying of
opposite-sex couples who got pregnant accidentally (and who therefore
might not have any genuine commitment to each other and indeed might
hardly know each other).159 So this is a bad argument for defenders of
traditional marriage law to make.
The responsible-procreation aim is also not about encouraging childless
heterosexual couples to get married, so that when they do procreate they
will be already married.160 The difference here is subtler. This articulation
of the aim also points to the proper sequence of events (“first comes love,
then comes marriage, then comes baby in the baby carriage”), but sug-
gests that the state should promote proper sequencing by pushing mar-
riage earlier, whereas the responsible-procreation aim is about pushing
pregnancy later. The state is often said to prefer as a general matter that
people be married rather than single, because married people are thought
to be more stable and healthy and therefore more productive and less
dysfunctional. But as a number of marriage laws reflect—including mini-
mum age requirements,161 waiting periods after obtaining a marriage li-
cense,162 incentives for pre-marital counseling and education,163 the
159. This is one (perhaps only) sound bit of reasoning in the Seventh Circuit decision.
See Baskin, 766 U.S. at 662 (“Heterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing unwanted
children; their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not produce un-
wanted children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go figure.”).
160. See, e.g., Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1238 (dissent) (“The State can offer marriage and its
benefits to encourage unmarried parents to marry and married parents to remain so”);
Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 548 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (“Defendant’s only asserted
justification for Kentucky’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage: ‘encouraging, promoting,
and supporting the formation of relationships that have the natural ability to procreate.’”);
Baskin, 766 U.S. at 662, *10 (“Indiana’s government thinks that straight couples tend to be
sexually irresponsible, producing unwanted children by the carload, and so must be pres-
sured . . . to marry”): . This misunderstanding seems to underlie Judge Posner’s drivers’
license analogy. Id. at 661 (“Even if possession of a driver’s license conferred benefits not
available to bicyclists (discounts, or tax credits, perhaps), the state could argue that it of-
fered these benefits only to induce drivers to obtain a license”). Posner’s analogy is more
imperfect than he supposes; whereas one must have a license to engage in driving behavior,
adult couples do not need a marriage license to engage in marital behavior (i.e., social
marriage).
161. See Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recogni-
tion of Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1832 (2012) (“The presumptive age of
marital consent is now eighteen in all states but two—Nebraska, where it is nineteen, and
Mississippi, where it is seventeen for males and fifteen for females. Every state permits
adolescents younger than eighteen to marry with either parental or judicial consent, with
most setting the minimum marital age at sixteen. Nearly forty states permit minors younger
than sixteen to marry with both parental and judicial consent, or in case of pregnancy or
birth of a child.”).
162. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.103a (2014) (three days); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 765.08 (2014) (five days).
163. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-31(authorizing counties to require pre-marital coun-
seling before issuing a marriage license); Alan J. Hawkins, Will Legislation to Encourage
Premarital Education Strengthen Marriage and Reduce Divorce?, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 79
(2007)  (“Five states—Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee—have
passed legislation encouraging couples to participate in formal premarital education: edu-
cation or counseling to help couples explore relationship strengths and weaknesses and
learn what it takes to have a successful marriage.”).
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requirement of solemnization,164 and limitations on who can perform
wedding ceremonies165—and as advocates for more restrictive rules for
getting married, such as covenant marriage laws, remind us: the state
wants people to marry only after uncoerced, careful reflection and a ma-
ture decision to commit to each other. It does not want to hurry young
people into it. The divorce rate among people who marry before age 18 is
double that of people who marry after age 25,166 and people who marry
that young are likely to discontinue their education and, following di-
vorce, end up on welfare.167 So it does not ring true to someone familiar
with family law to say that the state aims to hasten opposite-sex couples
into marriage when they have not yet procreated. In addition, this sup-
posed aim also would not clearly distinguish different types of couples
who could one day end up with a child in their custody. This is another
bad argument for the state.
Lastly, the responsible-procreation aim is certainly not about creating a
status that will make people, once they are in it, want to procreate.168 We
do not have a population shortage in this country.
Having cleared away the bramble bushes, I will explain what the re-
sponsible-procreation aim or “channeling function” actually is. Many
highly-respected legal scholars and historians have written about this
state purpose, which historically has been served by state control over
marriage in combination with sex laws, but which today must, it seems,
depend almost solely on using material state support to bolster the social
practice of marriage. (Just “almost” because laws criminalizing sex with
minors are still in place and sometimes actually enforced.169) The func-
tion is to deter procreation by heterosexuals who are not in committed rela-
tionships with each other. It is to discourage such couples from having sex
or, if they do have sex, then to encourage them to use contraceptives,
very carefully.170 If it is about “channeling” something, it is about chan-
164. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-4-13 (West 2014) (“Individuals who intend to
marry each other must present a marriage license that is issued under this chapter to an
individual who is authorized by IC 31-11-6 to solemnize marriages.”); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.16. Marriage contract, how made; officiating person.
165. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-6-1 (West 2014) (Persons authorized to solemnize mar-
riages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-6 (West 2014) (Who may solemnize marriages).
166. See Hamilton, supra note 161, at 1820 (“Of marriages entered at age twenty-five or
later, fewer than thirty percent end in divorce. Of marriages entered before age eighteen,
on the other hand, nearly seventy percent end in divorce. The earliest marriers, those ado-
lescents who enter marriage in their mid-teens, experience marital failure rates closer to a
sobering eighty percent.”).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (“Defendant adds a disingenuous twist to
the argument: traditional marriages contribute to a stable birth rate which, in turn, ensures
the state’s long-term economic stability.”); Joslin, supra note 152.
169. See, e.g., State v. Pryes, 771 N.W.2d 930 (Wis. App. 2009) (upholding statutory
rape law against equal protection claim that the law discriminated against unmarried mi-
nors relative to married minors).
170. See, e.g., JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 10 (2011); Linda C. McClain, Love,
Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, IN-
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neling sex and procreation (not children or couples) into marriage, in the
sense of confining sex and procreation to marriage and trying to induce
unmarried people not to engage in them. It is about reinforcing the long-
standing moral exhortation of parents, community leaders, and clergy:
“Wait until you are married.” It is about ensuring that fewer children
exist, rather than about what to do with children after they do exist
(though that is, of course, also a concern).
States have frequently asserted this state aim in many contexts other
than same-sex marriage, and courts have not questioned its authenticity
or legitimacy. For example, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the state’s first asserted
justification for discriminating between married and unmarried people in
its law governing sale of contraceptives was that it aimed to deter premar-
ital sex. The Court accepted that aim as authentic and legitimate, and
invalidated the law on equal protection grounds solely because it con-
cluded that prohibiting sale of contraceptives to unmarried people did
not serve that aim.171 In Martin v. Ziherl, the Virginia Supreme Court
considered a constitutional challenge to the commonwealth’s anti-forni-
cation law. The court acknowledged that the law’s purpose was to confine
procreation to marriage, but concluded that Lawrence precluded a state
from pursuing any aim by means of criminalizing consensual adult inti-
mate conduct.172
Karl Llewellyn encapsulated this reality about state marriage policy in
1932 with the pithy statement: “Marriage, to rehears old truth, is built on
the fact that there are two sexes, and attraction between them, and that
sexual union has results.”173 This understanding of marriage as prerequi-
site to having potentially procreative sex was already centuries old when
Llewellyn wrote that. Historian John Boswell’s research found in the late
Middle Ages “much more critical attention to conjugal infractions, ren-
dering parents more anxious about illegitimate and even unhealthy chil-
dren as reflections on their own past acts,” and that “[t]here was no
widely known method of limiting birth without forgoing conjugal rela-
tions, which . . . were adduced by the prevailing morality as the sole pur-
pose and justification of marriage.”
DIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW  9-10 (2014); Carl Schneider, The Channelling Function in Fam-
ily Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992). See also Murray, supra note 158, at 6-7 (noting
that historically in the U.S. “there was little space for sex outside the rubrics of marriage
and crime, and no refuge from state regulation of sex”); Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex,
Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089 (2002) (explaining
how legal rules other than those pertaining to marriage licensing, such as annulment based
on impotence, likewise reflected the traditional connection between legal marriage and
channeling of procreative sex, and why absence of infertility among bases for annulment or
divorce is not inconsistent with this connection).”
171. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-50 (1972).
172. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 368 (Va. 2005). See also State v. Pryes, 771
N.W.2d at *2 (citing “potential for a minor bearing a child outside of a marital relation-
ship” as a legitimate state concern justifying criminal law’s discrimination between those
who have sex with a non-spouse minor and those who have sex with a spouse minor).
173. K.N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1932).
For a still much earlier recognition of this function of legal marriage, see Milford v. Worces-
ter, 7 Mass. 48 (Mass. 1810).
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Eminent legal historian Lawrence Friedman elaborates:
The family (or rather, the traditional family) once had a kind of state
monopoly. Men and women could have sex legitimately only if they
were married—that is, if they formed a family. Only “families” in the
traditional sense could have babies. If you wanted sex, you were sup-
posed to get married. If you wanted babies, you were supposed to
get married. Sex and babies were otherwise (officially) off limits. Of
course, not everybody played by the rules. There was sex outside of
marriage, and there were babies born outside of traditional families.
But official society sharply condemned illicit sex and illicit
children.174
State control of marriage was a response to a need felt in society—
at least a need felt by many elites. Unfettered marriage and repro-
duction were dangerous to society . . .175 In short, for the reasons
mentioned, the state developed a keen interest in controlling mar-
riage (or, rather, the birth of children).176
Carl Schneider explains further that, to confine potentially procreative
sex to marital relationships, the state has used not only a stick—that is,
criminal prohibition on sex outside of marriage (which the state is less
able to do after Lawrence), but also a carrot—that is, reinforcing the nor-
mative value society and cultural groups attach to marriage by conferring
material benefits on those who do it (which the state still can do):
[I]n the channelling function the law creates or (more often) sup-
ports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable ends
. . . . [I]t is their very presence, the social currency they have, and the
governmental support they receive which combine to make it seem
reasonable and even natural for people to use them . . . . Institu-
tions . . . by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct
by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one
direction as against the many other directions that would theoreti-
cally be possible.177
Our legislator might see family law as setting a framework of rules,
one of whose effects is to shape, sponsor, and sustain the model of
marriage I described above: It writes standards for entry into mar-
riage, standards which prohibit polygamous, incestuous, and homo-
sexual unions . . . . [P]rohibitions against non-marital sexual activity
and discouragements against quasi-marital arrangements in principle
confine sexual life to marriage . . . . Laws criminalizing fornication,
cohabitation, adultery, and bigamy in principle limit parenthood to
married couples, and those legal disadvantages that still attach to il-
legitimacy make it wise to confine parenthood to marriage.178
174. FRIEDMAN, supra note 170, at 9-10.
175. Id. at 51.
176. Id. at 55. See also GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 170, at 10 (“Marriage was
the door to sex and children (for respectable people). Controlling marriage was a way to
made sure that diseased, criminal, and feeble-minded people were unable to marry and to
breed.”).
177. Schneider, supra note 170, at 498.
178. Id. at 502.
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[T]he law can channel by disfavoring competing institutions . . . .
Bans on fornication and cohabitation mean (in principle) that to
have sexual relations, one must marry. Sometimes competing institu-
tions are merely disadvantaged. For instance, the rule making con-
tracts for meretricious consideration unenforceable traditionally
denied unmarried couples the law’s help in resolving some
disputes.179
[T]he law’s channeling function forms and reinforces institutions
which have significant social support and which, optimally, come to
seem so natural that people use them almost unreflectively. It relies
centrally but not exclusively on social approval of the institution, on
social rewards for its use, and on social disfavor of its alternatives.180
In short, the state tries to get immature people who are physically capa-
ble of accidentally conceiving a child to hold off on, or at least be very
careful about, sex until they are in a mature, committed relationship. It
does this because extramarital pregnancies are an immense social prob-
lem, leading to over a million abortions every year and to many more
millions of children being born to single, and mostly immature, mothers
who are likely to need public assistance and forego higher education and
career.181 It does it by reinforcing an independently existing social prac-
tice that has powerful normative force and that is understood as the only
approved site for procreation. Cultural forces and Supreme Court deci-
sions have made it ever more difficult for the state to encourage absti-
nence before marriage,182 but it is still trying desperately to accomplish
this aim with (for the most part) only carrots. The Supreme Court has not
yet invalidated states’ statutory rape laws,183 but otherwise, all the state
can do now is to try to make more attractive than it would otherwise be a
social practice and status (marriage) that has traditionally been the only
179. Id. at 503.
180. Id. at 504. See also McClain, supra note 170, at 2133 (“A significant idea at the core
of contemporary debates in family law. . . is that a basic purpose of family law is to support
fundamental social institutions, like marriage and parenthood, and to steer people into
participating in them”), 2135 (““At the core of many contemporary debates about the state
of the family—and family law—is the question of how to assess challenges to this expected
sequence of love, marriage, and the baby carriage.”); E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE
FOR? 53-54 (1999) (“Marriage has long been seen as what makes sex legitimate. . Sex
outside marriage’s white picket fence was long considered adultery or fornication—‘th’
expense of spirit in a waste of shame,’ as Shakespeare once sonnetized.”).
181. Cf. State v. Fisher, 565 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding Wiscon-
sin’s statutory rape law and observing that “the United States Supreme Court has itself
observed that “teenage pregnancies . . . have significant social, medical, and economic con-
sequences for both the mother and her child, and the State.” Michael M. v. Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981). Among the consequences of teenage pregnancies are the attend-
ant psychological, medical and sociological problems associated with a child bearing a
child.”).
182. In addition to Lawrence throwing anti-fornication laws into question, decisions of
the Court relating to illegitimate children disallowed (fortunately) stigmatizing non-marital
births. See Illegitimacy, JUSTIA http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/90-ille-
gitimacy.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
183. But see In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003) (holding that enforcement of an anti-
fornication law in delinquency proceeding against sixteen-year old violated state
constitution).
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approved site for sex, and that still stands for the idea that people should
not conceive children until they are in a mature, committed relationship.
I am not sure how else I would explain to my students why states (and
the church before the state) came to take so great an interest in adult
intimate relationships that they not only created and attached costly ben-
efits to this special legal status (subsidized by single people), but on top of
that criminalized intimacy outside that legal status, if not to confine po-
tentially procreative activity to approved and (presumed) permanent re-
lationships.184 Or how states expected to accomplish eugenic aims by
excluding from marriage epileptics (as most once did) and sibling pairs
(as all still do), if not based on a presupposition that potentially-procrea-
tive sex would take place only within a marital relationship.185 Yet today,
for the purpose of convincing federal judges to mandate legal reform they
desire, a substantial portion of the family law academy is striving mightily
to deny what we all know to be true.186
These professors, other advocates for same-sex marriage, and now a
host of federal judges offer several flawed arguments for the position that
discouraging irresponsible procreation is not a state purpose, or not one
with any explanatory power. One begins with the premise that marriage
means many things to people and that people have many reasons for get-
ting married, not just to have children, and it ends by concluding solely
from this premise that limiting procreation outside of committed relation-
ships is not a “central” state purpose.187 This is a patent non sequitur. The
state’s purposes for offering something to the public and the reasons pri-
vate individuals have for accepting it are two entirely different things,
with no necessary connection between them. Moreover, subjective judg-
ments of centrality are irrelevant.
Another clearly flawed argument begins with the premise that the state
has other interests that legal marriage serves, or that “marriage” has
many “purposes,” including some as to which same-sex couples are simi-
184. Cf. Abrams & Brooks, supra note 25, at 11 (“Beginning with the Apostle Paul, we
see the rise of the idea that sexuality is dangerous and best cabined by an institution de-
signed to contain it (“is it better to marry than to burn”). The rise of marriage in pre-
modern Europe seems to have been driven by the Church’s desire to see the European
peasantry clean up its act, and to get sexuality under the yoke of marriage.”); Kevin Mac-
Donald, The Establishment and Maintenance of Socially Imposed Monogamy in Western
Europe, 14 POL. & LIVE SCI. 3, 10 (1995) (explaining that the Catholic Church regulated
the social practice of marriage and promoted the norm of sex only within marriage at a
time when the Church stood to collect the estates of childless decedents); Doe v. Duling,
603 F. Supp. 960, 968 (E.D. Va. 1985) (noting argument by state officials that challenged
“fornication statute is designed to minimize illegitimate births”).
185. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 170, at 49-55; id. at 49 (“The new study of eugenics
provided the state with strong support for its movement to regulate marriage. It gave a
scientific veneer to campaigns to control the supply of babies, and to encourage the birth of
healthy babies in moral families.”).
186. Many state courts have acknowledged the channeling-of-procreation function. See
Abrams & Brooks, supra note 25, at 2.
187. See, e.g., Rainey Memorandum, supra note 18, at 13-14; Bourke Amicus 1, supra
note 18, at 3 (“[P]rocreation is not the central purpose of or a requirement for civil mar-
riage. Couples marry for many reasons”).
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larly situated, such as encouraging family stability (in particular, stability
of families with children).188 This premise is obviously true but it does
nothing to support a conclusion that preventing pre-marital procreation
has not been one of the state’s aims in creating and maintaining a legal
status of marriage with attendant material benefits. Under any level of
judicial review it is irrelevant that a law serves purposes other than the
one the state identifies as justifying a classification.189 And under rational
basis review, the state is not required to show that same-sex marriage
would not serve any of the interests it has for maintaining the legal status
of marriage, nor that its interest in preventing conception of children
outside committed relationships is the most important or “central” or
“core” interest it has (though it might well be).190 Rather, it need only
show that it has a legitimate interest that legal marriage for opposite-sex
couples serves but legal marriage for same-sex couples would not. As Jus-
tice Kennedy stated in writing for the Court in Heller:
[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis “is not a license
for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices.” Nor does it authorize “the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegis-
lature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy deter-
minations . . . For these reasons, a classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a
strong presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship be-
tween the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose.191
This not a sterile doctrine designed only to discourage litigation. A key
normative assumption underlying this doctrine is that, except in excep-
tional cases, social transformation should occur through democratic delib-
eration and majoritarian action.192
And as a matter of fact, the state’s interest in preventing undesirable
procreation, especially single parenthood among teenagers, remains ex-
ceedingly strong, because of the huge personal and societal costs this cre-
ates.193 Attempting to bolster the attractiveness of marriage as something
188. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If the state’s only
interest in allowing marriage is to protect children . . .); Bourke Amicus 1, supra note 18, at
10; Abrams & Brooks, supra note 25, at 4, 5, 25, 33 (complaining repeatedly that certain
judges have claimed channeling reproduction is “only” or “singular” purpose of legal mar-
riage, without quoting a single statement by any judge that says this), 22 (conceding that
the judge who is their main target actually said “marriage has served ‘many important
functions’”).
189. Baskin, 2014 WL 4359059, *9.
190. See Bourke Amicus 1, supra note 18, at 8.
191. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (citations omitted).
192. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718–19 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[O]ur constitutional order assigns the resolution of questions of this nature to the
people.”).
193. See Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 340-41
(1996)
(“The frequent and often impassioned invocation of ‘illegitimacy’ as a crisis,
an epidemic, and the most urgent social problem of the day suggests that
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worth waiting for therefore remains a legitimate and important aim for
the state. To deny this is not only disingenuous, it is a slap in the face of
parents who are trying to instill this idea in their adolescent offspring,
struggling against all the contrary messages that bombard youth in popu-
lar culture.
Advocates’ and judges’ denial of the responsible-procreation aim also
makes me wonder if I am misremembering the moral instruction of par-
ents, church leaders, popular songs, and television programs in my child-
hood, which I recall placing a heavy emphasis on waiting till marriage to
have sex.194 Why wait for marriage, rather than a lunar eclipse, before
having sex? Because marriage was a profound and magical status of al-
most unrivaled importance, something one “enters into” once and for-
ever, receiving thereby esteem, privileges, benefits, and opportunities
that unmarried people did not enjoy, including the privilege of child bear-
ing.195 It was something worth waiting for. It was something about which
we dreamed.196
families begun and continued outside of marriage—overwhelmingly families
consisting of a woman and her children—are the primary problem. . . . This
public alarm and indignation about ‘irresponsible’ reproduction reaches a fe-
vered pitch when such reproduction implicates the public fisc through wel-
fare programs. In the recent debates over welfare reform, lawmakers and
others made repeated appeals for legislative change that would end ‘illegiti-
macy,’ restore personal responsibility, and get people (women and adoles-
cent females) to stop having children that they cannot afford to support
without public assistance.”).
194. Cf. McClain, supra note 170, at 2133-34
(saying of the ‘First comes love . . .’ ditty: “This childhood rhyme . . . illus-
trates the channelling function of family law because it reflects societal ex-
pectations of the proper sequence that people should follow in matters of
love, sex, and procreation. Children chanting this rhyme seem to have
learned this basic sequence: kissing signals or leads to love, courtship, dating,
or what have you, which lead to a social institution, marriage, which leads to
another social institution, parenthood, represented by the baby carriage.”).
195. Cf. Schneider, supra note 170, at 503 (noting that two channeling techniques are
“simply recognizing and endorsing institutions, thus giving them some aura of legitimacy
and permanence” and “to reward participation in an institution”), 507 (“[M]arriage offers
people a kind of relationship with social and legal advantages which are primarily available
precisely because the law gives marriage a special status”); Llewellyn, supra note 173, at
1302 (“It is Law which sets a goal, contains a threat, and urges to a process – all in terms
any youth can understand. To deny power to it in producing some of what is symbolizes
would be to deny power to the flag or the Constitution in producing national feeling and
unity.”); Abrams & Brooks, supra note 25, at 32 (“Most people decide to marry. . . because
they think that it is the ‘right thing to do’ if they want to have children. . . because of the
long-term social meaning of marriage.”).
196. Cf. Nina Totenberg, Meet The 83-Year-Old Taking On The U.S. Over Same-Sex
Marriage” NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 21, 2013), http:// www.npr.org/2013/03/21/174944430/
meet-the-83-year-old-taking-on-the-us-over-same-sex-rnarriage (quoting Edith Windsor:
“The fact is, marriage is this magic thing . . . I mean forget all the financial stuff—mar-
riage . . . symbolizes commitment and love like nothing else in the world. And it’s known
all over the world. I mean, wherever you go, if you’re married, that means something to
people, and it meant a difference in feeling the next day.”).
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B. MEANS-ENDS RATIONALITY
Arguments against finding a sufficient connection between opposite-
sex-only marriage law and the aim of delaying potentially-procreative sex
are so illogical I do not know whether it is more charitable to assume
those who make them believe what they are saying or that they do not.
1. Efficacy
First there is the “it’s not working” argument, fairly rare because the
impossibility of supporting the starting premise is evident. It begins with a
premise that states are not succeeding at this aim, followed by a conclu-
sion that there is therefore no relation between marriage law and that
aim. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, for example, Judge Posner wrote:
So if the state’s policy of trying to channel procreative sex into mar-
riage were succeeding, we would expect a drop in the percentage of
children born to an unmarried woman, or at least not an increase in
that percentage. Yet in fact that percentage has been rising even
since Indiana in 1997 reenacted its prohibition of same-sex marriage
(thus underscoring its determined opposition to such marriage) and
for the first time declared that it would not recognize same-sex mar-
riages contracted in other states or abroad . . . . In 1997, the year of
the enactment, 33 percent of births in Indiana were to unmarried
women; in 2012 (the latest year for which we have statistics) the per-
centage was 43 percent . . . . There is no indication that these states’
laws, ostensibly aimed at channeling procreation into marriage, have
had any such effect.197
Law and economics scholars must cringe when seeing the analytical
gaffe embedded in this reasoning. It implicitly assumes no other counter-
vailing factors influence the extramarital birth rate, when everyone, in-
cluding Posner, knows quite well that there are.198 Accordingly, it adopts
as a baseline a point in the past that is arbitrary (as the first parenthetical
implies, Indiana law already precluded same-sex marriage in 1997), and
compares rates then with rates today. Unless one can eliminate the effect
of other variables, this comparison is meaningless. The change in rates
Posner cites is entirely consistent with a hypothesis that traditional mar-
riage law is very successful in reducing the non-marital pregnancy rate.
The appropriate baseline is what the rate would have been in the absence
197. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 665 (7th Cir. 2014).
198. See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Markets in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L.
REV. 59, 63 (1987). (“because the stigma of illegitimacy, for both parents and children, has
also lessened, a smaller fraction of babies born out of wedlock is put up for adoption. The
decline in that stigma is also partly responsible for the increase in premarital sex and the
casual attitude of many engaged in it about contraception. And more than a change in
moral attitudes is involved. The welfare system enables indigent single women and girls,
who might otherwise be forced to give up their children for adoption, to keep them.”);
Carmen Solomon-Fears, Nonmarital Births: An Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICES  2 (2014) (noting decline in the rate of births among married couples), 3 (“Many
social science analysts attribute the increase in nonmarital births to the decades-long de-
cline of ‘shotgun marriages.’”).
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of traditional marriage law; success would exist if the rate has risen less
than it would have otherwise. Whether that is the case is, I imagine, im-
possible to prove or refute.
That partly explains why, under rational basis review, a state need not
demonstrate that its law is succeeding in serving the asserted state inter-
est. It can say “we continue to hope that this will have some positive
impact, some efficacy at counteracting the many socio-cultural forces that
have been pushing up the extramarital pregnancy rate.” As a parent of
five children and as someone who believes it highly desirable to minimize
the number of children who are either aborted or born into an economi-
cally marginal and divorce-like (birth parents having already dissolved
their relationship) situation, I have that hope. The burden under rational
basis review instead falls on the persons challenging the law, who must
show it is irrational for the state to suppose its law could serve that pur-
pose at all. As Justice Kennedy has written:
[A] classification “must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could pro-
vide a rational basis for the classification.” A State, moreover, has no
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statu-
tory classification. “[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.” A statute is presumed constitutional,
and “[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement
to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,” whether
or not the basis has a foundation in the record.199
The plaintiffs in these marriage cases clearly cannot meet this burden.
This is in part because no scientific work has been done (or perhaps could
possibly be done) isolating the effect of the “wait till marriage” message
from all other possible influences on the decision making of unmarried
heterosexual couples. It is also because there is plenty of anecdotal evi-
dence to the contrary.
Certainly the “wait till marriage” moral message, from both the state
and private authority figures, was highly effective in my community when
I was a teenager in the 70s. Shame attached to pregnancy outside mar-
riage, to the point of ostracism. If a high school girl got pregnant, she was
never seen at school again. Boys and girls were terrified of making such a
mistake. Fear attended any closeness between boy and girl, and we would
stop before things went too far, or the bolder would push themselves past
the painful embarrassment of buying condoms. The fear arose partly be-
cause of not wanting to be saddled with parenthood even before begin-
ning life as independent adults, but it was also very much a product of our
dividing the relational universe into marital and pre-marital and associat-
ing moral danger with intimacy in the latter universe. In our minds, it was
profoundly wrong to conceive a child, or even to have sex, when one had
not crossed that mystical threshold.
199. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
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Now it is a half-century after the sexual and cultural revolution of the
60s. Attitudes toward extramarital sex have changed continually since
then; in fact, remaining a virgin till marriage is downright weird in main-
stream American society today. Single motherhood does not carry as
great a stigma as it once did. Throwing open the divorce gates has taken
some of the sparkle off marriage (showing that legal changes can impact
popular perception of social institutions). These two trends, one the de-
moralizing of sex, the other disenchantment as to marriage, have signifi-
cantly thwarted the responsible-procreation aim of marriage as a social
and legal institution. A recent report to Congress states: “Many analysts
attribute this [rise in rate of non-marital births] to changed attitudes over
the past few decades about fertility and marriage. They find that many
adult women and teenage girls no longer feel obliged to marry before, or
as a consequence of, having children.”
It is entirely legitimate, however, for the state to resist continued ero-
sion of the marriage-procreation conceptual connection. In doing so, it
tries to assist those of us who are parents of teenagers and who are trying
to pass on the message we were given in our youth, a message both moral
and pragmatic: “Slow down, be careful, do not conceive a child until you
are married. It is wrong and irresponsible. And it would derail your life
plan.” The normative connection between marriage and childbearing
does still remain in the minds of much of the population and continues to
have behavioral effects.200 It might be more muted and less universal
than it was a half-century ago, but it has been effective for my teenage
daughters, in our liberal and non-religious household, and for their
friends; they have talked and fantasized about marriage since they were
little (without needing any encouragement from their parents), and the
image of being preceded down the aisle by a baby belly would shatter the
fantasy. Any reference they make to having children is couched in a mari-
tal, co-parenting context. They talk about the few pregnant teens in their
public school the same way they talk about kids who get caught using
LSD or breaking into houses. It is no longer shocking, but it is still
shameful and something good kids do not do.201 The traditional expecta-
tion that conception will take place only within marriage is undoubtedly
even more prevalent among social conservatives, for whom virginity
200. See Pew Center Survey, Ch 4 (reporting that 49% of the general public identifies
“having children” as a very important reason to get married); Baskin, 766 F. 3d at 658
(“Marriage confers respectability on a sexual relationship.); Schneider, supra note 170, at
518 (“Even if social behavior has changed dramatically, social norms may not have. Even
if, for example, families less often consist of a married couple and their biological offspring,
that grouping may still represent a powerful cultural norm. . . . Finally, even if behavior and
norms are changing, society might wish to alter the direction of change.”), 516 n.58 (citing
study showing an increase in the late 80s in disapproval of extramarital sex); Llewellyn,
supra note 173, at 1286 (“Once conceived, once accepted, the oversimple norm-concept
maintains itself stubbornly, despite all changes in conditions; it becomes the socially given,
right, ideal-type of ‘marriage’”).
201. Cf. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011) (discussing the stigma that still
attaches to non-marital pregnancy).
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pledges like “True Love Waits” and “Silver Ring Thing” became popular
in the 1990s and remain so today, even if the pledge is not as effective as
parents would like it to be. And the pledge is not virginity for life, nor
virginity until age 21, but rather virginity until marriage.
A few thought experiments confirm the continued behavioral efficacy
of marriage. First, imagine that marriage did not exist, as either a legal or
a social institution. Imagine that relationships never acquired any status
more special than boyfriend/. Imagine how sexual behavior might differ
today among young people. Once one has a boyfriend or girlfriend, one
has reached the relationship pinnacle. There is nothing beyond that to
aspire to or hope for. Why wait, then, to have sex? Or why be very careful
about contraception if one does decide to go forward with intercourse?
There would still be the pragmatic, self-interested reasons: you want to do
X later in life, and if you get pregnant you would either have to undergo
an abortion (an ugly prospect) or forget about doing X (though increas-
ingly our society is trying, at substantial taxpayer expense, to make it pos-
sible to do any X you want to do even if you do accidentally become
pregnant, because it seems cruel to make girls assume the costs of their
irresponsibility). But such practical considerations are of limited efficacy
in altering young persons’ behavior in moments of high hormone activity.
What would be missing, or at least greatly diminished relative to a world
in which marriage remains as a cherished institution, would be the com-
peting irrational forces of fear, romantic fantasy, and moral compunction.
Or at least the state may reasonably suppose. The state should need
only to say plausibly that it perpetuates the legal status of marriage,
rather than getting out of the marriage business, because it continues to
think that by doing so it can continue to bolster a cultural practice that to
some indeterminable degree reduces sexual behavior outside of commit-
ted relationships by couples capable of conceiving a child through sex.
Indeed, in an increasingly areligious society, the state is the only authority
upholding the cultural practice of marriage for a large percentage of the
population, including my daughters. Maintaining a cultural practice that
induces unmarried opposite-sex couples to forego sexual activity is some-
thing the state thinks worth doing because sexual activity can result in
pregnancies for those couples and the state does not want pregnancy to
occur from casual encounters nor in relationships that have not matured
to the point of long-term commitment, because unplanned single
parenthood is enormously costly for private individuals (especially
mothers and children) and for the state. Children born to an unmarried
female are far less likely than children born to a married woman to have
both parents present and cooperating during the crucial developmental
period of infancy and to have long-term financial and emotional support
from their fathers. The state prefers that those children never come into
existence, so it strives to prevent their conception, with the few means
still available to it.
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2. The infertile
A second argument against the responsible-procreation aim, the most
common one, takes the form ‘but the state must be lying about trying to
reduce extramarital pregnancy through marriage law, because it does not
impose a fertility test for getting a marriage license.’202 An implicit major
premise of this syllogism is that anything for which the state does not test
in its application for a marriage license must be something that bears no
relation to any purpose of marriage law.
It is inconceivable that any advocates who proffer this argument, or
any judges who repeat it, actually believe that premise to be true. If they
did, then they should also take the position that the state’s interest in
marriage has nothing to do with long-term commitment, intimate rela-
tionships, cohabitation, sharing of a household, receiving emotional sup-
port, or financial inter-dependence,203 and that the state must not care
whether one member of an applicant couple is already physically abusing
or cheating on the other. State marriage license applications ask for only
the most basic information—names, ages, addresses.204 They do not ask
whether the applicants intend to live together, how long they plan to re-
main a couple, whether their relationship is intimate rather than platonic,
or even whether they have ever met before applying. The application pro-
cess also does not screen out those with a history indicating they are
likely to batter a spouse or commit adultery. This “why doesn’t the state
exclude the infertile?” argument should lead courts to conclude that
states have no purpose for legal marriage whatsoever except to deny
something inherently purposeless to children (given that age is one of the
202. See, e.g., Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, (N.D. Fla. 2014) (“It is the kind of
argument that, in another context, might be ‘accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity.’”);
Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1291 (N.D. Okla. 2014); id. at 1292
(“[T]he purported justification simply ‘makes no sense’ in light of how Oklahoma treats
other non-procreative couples desiring to marry”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1221
(10th Cir. 2014); Baskin, 766 F.3d at 660; Kitchen Amicus, supra note 129, at 5-10; Bourke
Amicus 1, supra note 18, at 3, 7-8; Bourke Amicus 2, supra note 18, at 28; Hollingsworth
Amicus, supra note 31, at 5, 24; Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014);
Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho), at *23; DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d
757, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2014); DeLeon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 654 (W.D. Tex. 2014);
Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d. at 478–79; Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1021; Schaefer, 2014 WL
3702493, at *14-15, Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962; Golinski v. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2012); BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 180
(relating questioning by trial court judge). Even Justice Scalia has given credence to this
illogical argument. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” for pur-
poses of proscribing that conduct. . . what justification could there possibly be for denying
the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples? Surely not the encouragement of procrea-
tion, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”).
203. Cf. Hollingsworth Amicus, supra note 31, at 25-29 (arguing that emotional support
and mutual financial support are “some of the purposes of marriage recognized in Califor-
nia law, other than procreating  and childrearing,” yet not explaining why the state does
not limit marriage to couples who do these things).
204. See, e.g., STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH APPLICATION FOR LICENSE
TO MARRY, available at http://clerk.slco.org/marriage/; MARYLAND COURTS, Marriage
Licences, http://www.courts.state.md.us/clerks/queenannes/marriage.html (last visited Dec
19, 2014).
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very few things asked). An analogous argument in the parentage context
would lead to the ridiculous conclusion that securing child support is not
among the state’s purposes for having paternity laws, because there is no
financial-means test for paternity and the state routinely confers legal
parent status on men with no income—indeed, even on men serving life
sentences in prison.
In addition, there is an obvious and benign reason why a state would
choose not to exclude from a law’s ambit everyone who falls outside the
law’s purpose, even if there were only one purpose—namely, that the
costs entailed in excluding them are not worth bearing. Requiring hetero-
sexual couples to pass a fertility test before they can receive a marriage
license would be exceedingly costly, not only in terms of the money re-
quired to conduct such tests, which can run into the thousands of dollars,
but also in terms of the incursion on individuals’ privacy it would en-
tail.205 Some courts and amici have stated that it would be constitution-
ally problematic to impose a fertility test for marriage, because of the
invasion of privacy this would entail for opposite-sex couples,206 yet they
fail to see the implication that this justifies the state in not doing so. In
addition, state legislators would be understandably reluctant to open the
political can of worms entailed in trying to tailor legal marriage more
narrowly by establishing a maximum age for marriage, given the possibil-
ity of exceptional cases, the fact that natural age-related infertility is
something that happens to women but not men, and the danger of people
rushing into ill-considered marriages as they approach the maximum age.
A requirement that couples wishing to marry express an intention to pro-
create would also be highly problematic; it would be unreliable and
courts would likely find it, too, an unconstitutional violation of privacy.207
So in theory, states could exclude infertile couples, but it would just be
too difficult and costly to do so.
Similarly, someday polygamists in Minnesota might challenge that
state’s marriage laws, which by voluntary legislative action now extend to
same-sex couples, as violating the equal protection rights of second, third,
etc. spiritual wives. Minnesota might respond by saying its purpose for
having legal marriage for all and only monogamous couples, including
same-sex couples, is to ensure that every competent adult is practically
able to enter into a legal marriage with someone, which these women
could do with some man who is not already married. The plaintiffs would
then respond by saying if that were the case, why does Minnesota allow
205. See, Fertility Test Cost, Cost Helper Health, http://health.costhelper.com/fertility-
testing.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (indicating cost of fertility testing for women up to
$5000).
206. See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 662 (“It would be considered an invasion of privacy to
condition the eligibility of a heterosexual couple to marry on whether both prospective
spouses were fertile”); Bourke Amicus 1, supra note 18, at 7; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1222. The
Tenth Circuit, immediately after expressing the view that a fertility inquiry would be un-
constitutional, faults the state for not doing one on an individualized basis. Id.
207. See Kitchen Amicus, supra note 129, at 6 (arguing that it would be
unconstitutional).
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bisexuals to enter into same-sex marriages? Is the law not over-inclusive
as to that purpose? To which the state could legitimately reply that it does
not wish to get into the messy business of trying to differentiate “true
gays and lesbians” from bisexuals when issuing marriage licenses.
At least under rational basis review, the explanations above for not
attempting to exclude heterosexual couples who cannot or prefer not to
conceive children are entirely sufficient. Justice Kennedy again:
[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legis-
lature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between
means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review
because it ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in prac-
tice it results in some inequality.’ The problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accom-
modations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.208
3. Serving an aim by excluding
A third argument same-sex-marriage advocates present is so nonsensi-
cal that courts’ falling prey to it is astonishing. This is the argument that
states cannot plausibly claim that laws limiting legal marriage to opposite-
sex couples reflect an aim of confining procreation to marriage, because
excluding same-sex couples does not serve that aim.209
a. The wrong question
This argument rests on an implicit major premise no thinking person
would endorse—namely, that the state must give to every person every
benefit it gives to any person unless it can show that by excluding some-
one it would thereby promote the purpose for which it confers the bene-
fit. No state benefit program would satisfy such a requirement. Does
excluding children of the rich from free-school lunch programs serve the
state aim of child nutrition? Does denying me Secret Service protection
promote the state aim of making governmental service safe?
Imagine a state agency office building that initially has identical bath-
room facilities for men and women. But then the agency decides to ac-
commodate female employees who have infant children they are nursing,
by converting some unused space into a spa-like nursing suite, with soft
208. Heller v. Doe by Doe, , 509 U.S. at 312, 321 (1993).
209. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, (D. Or. 2014), 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128; Bourke Amicus 1,
supra note 18, at 23; Holder, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1291; DeLeon, 975 F.Supp.2d at 654; BALL,
supra note 154, at 6 (“The book seeks to comprehensively address and refute social con-
servatives’ often-repeated claims that same-sex marriage bans promote responsibility pro-
creation and children’s welfare.”); BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 85 (describing
questioning along this line by trial court judge in Prop 8 case), 89 (describing plaintiffs’
attorney arguing along these lines in media appearance); Julie A. Nice, The Descent of
Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 781, 785
(2012) (identifying as “the constitutional dispute’s core question: whether the government
needs, and whether it has, any evidence to support the now-residual justification that ban-
ning same-sex marriage is rationally related to the purported governmental interest of en-
suring responsible procreation”).
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lights, calming music, reclining chairs, and staff to assist and to serve tea.
The agency communicates to its employees that the facility is available to
nursing mothers, and it does not create any comparable facility for men.
Some men, fathers of infant children let us say, complain that they would
also enjoy such a facility. It would help them relax, would make them
more productive, cement their loyalty to the company, etc. In other
words, giving men the same thing could serve other agency interests. If
the men should sue the agency in federal court alleging a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, and if the agency says that its primary aim is to
promote the physical health of employees’ infant children, should it have
to show that excluding men serves that aim? No. That including them
would disserve that aim? No. Must it show that, as to every agency inter-
est served by the nursing facility, giving men a comparable facility would
not serve it? No. The agency might well think the nursing facility serves
several purposes, including also boosting employee morale and facilitat-
ing employees’ return to work after having a child, purposes it could
serve also by creating a nice relaxation room for men (and non-nursing
women). But under no level of scrutiny is the agency required to prove
that including men in the relaxation-room program would not serve any
of its aims. The agency can give a benefit only to nursing women on the
grounds that only they serve the aim of promoting infant health.
Thus, what the state must show is not that excluding same-sex couples
does serve the state interest in discouraging pregnancy among persons not
in committed relationships, but rather that including same-sex couples in
legal marriage would not serve that state interest, which it can easily
do.210 Similarly, the state can sufficiently justify excluding the wealthy
from free-school lunch programs by pointing out that including them is
unnecessary for promoting child nutrition, and it can justify denying me a
security detail by pointing out that including me in the security program
would not serve the aims of encouraging citizens to run for political office
and ensuring continuity of elected officials. In each instance, the state can
legitimately add: “And why must we incur the additional expense of in-
cluding more people who want the benefit when doing so would not serve
our aim, especially when we have to tax other people to pay for the bene-
fit?” Likewise, a state can constitutionally decide that one of its purposes
for having any marriage law at all is to create some incentive for poten-
tially procreative couples to behave differently,211 and that it does not
want to incur the costs either of identifying opposite-sex couples who in
210. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 (1974) (upholding exclusion of conscien-
tious objectors from government program of educational assistance to veterans, intended
to incentivize military service, stating: “When, as in this case, the inclusion of one group
promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups would not,
we cannot say that the statute’s classification of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is invid-
iously discriminatory.”).
211. Cf. Schneider, supra note 170, at 522 (“No doubt the channelling function relies on
unprovable assumptions. But ‘all schemes of statutory regulation are ultimately based on
unprovable assumptions about human nature.’ Thus the channelling function ought not be
dismissed out of hand because measurement is difficult.”).
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fact cannot reproduce or of including couples who are obviously incapa-
ble of procreating (because its members are of the same sex).
Because the state need only explain that including same-sex couples in
legal marriage would not serve the intended responsible-procreation aim,
advocates’ claims about same-sex marriage having no effect on opposite-
sex couples are totally inapt. A state could concede that marriage law
would be equally effective in inducing unmarried people to avoid con-
ceiving a child even if the state issued marriage certificates to same-sex
couples, but still constitutionally refuse to do that. Similarly, the govern-
ment could concede that giving free lunches to children of the rich would
not undermine the nutrition of poor children, but nevertheless continue
limiting free lunches to children of the poor in order to limit the cost of
the free lunch program.
b. Protesting too much?
In addition to being inapt, claims about same-sex marriage having no
effect are implausible. Yet they typically take a categorical and pejorative
form. Advocates for same-sex marriage do not modestly suggest that
same-sex marriage is unlikely to alter significantly what most heterosexu-
als think of marriage. Perhaps fearing courts will apply rational basis re-
view, so that any concession on the facts could be fatal, advocates boldly
and disdainfully assert that it is impossible same-sex marriage could have
any effect whatsoever on how any heterosexuals think about marriage, so
anyone claiming it must be delusional.212 Courts generally follow suit,
treating the concern dismissively.213
So now try a second thought experiment. Imagine that instead of elimi-
nating all marriage laws, states instead voluntarily expanded the availabil-
ity of legal marriage so there were no longer any exclusions. Any two or
more persons who want the state to treat them as legally married to each
other (or if incompetent, whose guardians want them treated as such) can
obtain a state marriage certificate. Legislators explain that the same-sex
marriage debate has convinced them that anyone who could benefit from
the practical advantages or the symbolic validation legal marital status
212. See, e.g., Rainey Memorandum, supra note 18, at 13 (“it is illogical to think that
allowing same-sex marriage will somehow make heterosexual couples less likely to
marry”); Bourke Amicus 1, supra note 18, at 23-24 (“[T]here is no basis in logic or social
experience to suppose that such couples [heterosexual] will lose respect for the institution
if same-sex couples are permitted to marry. . . or have any influence on the marital or
procreative decisions of different-sex couples. . .”); Kitchen Amicus, supra note 129, at 23
(same); Hollingsworth Amicus, supra note 31, at 3-4 (“It is not rational to assume that
granting same-sex couples the right to marry will influence the behavior of opposite-sex
couples. . . . Petitioners’ responsible procreation theory also has no basis in logic or social
experience.”).
213. See, e.g., Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1223 (“We emphatically agree with the numerous
cases decided since Windsor that it is wholly illogical to believe that state recognition of the
love and commitment between same-sex couples will alter the most intimate and personal
decisions of opposite-sex couples”); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478 (E.D. Va.
2014) (“[R]ecognizing a gay individual’s fundamental right to marry can in no way influ-
ence whether other individuals will marry”).
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confers should have it, and any lovers who want to make a bold public
declaration of their love should receive the state’s assistance in doing so.
Two brothers might develop an intimate relationship with each other and
feel the sting of societal disapproval, which they think legal marriage will
erase. Three friends share a household, with one earning income, one
maintaining the household, and the other caring for children, and they
want to file a single, collective tax return as a marital unit so they collec-
tively pay less. Middle school students are tired of adults’ giggling when
they say they are “going out” with someone, and getting legally married
would allow them to demonstrate how real and powerful their love is.
The state has decided to accommodate all these desires. Perhaps legal
marriage would even extend to human-animal relationships: an elderly
widow wants to execute a will leaving money for care of her cat and wor-
ries about a will contest, so she wants to legally marry the cat and thereby
establish inheritance rights. Perhaps she also wants the world to know
that she loves her cat, and she would feel like a second-class citizen if the
state glorified people lucky enough to have a human companion but not
those whose only cohabitant is a pet.
The basic idea of this thought experiment is that legislators want to
make all benefits of legal marriage, brought home to them by the same-
sex-marriage movement, available to all constituents who might want any
of them for any reason. They could create some other legal status with a
different name or amend various laws so benefits do not depend on rela-
tionship status, but that would be complicated and risk making some peo-
ple feel disparaged, so they adopt the easy route of extending the
institution of marriage far beyond its antiquated traditional limits.
Is there any doubt that this hypothetical, extreme expansion of legal
marriage would change public perceptions of and attitudes about mar-
riage?214 Marriage clearly would lose its specialness; no one would dream
about marriage in that world, no one would wait for it to occur before
having sex, and no one would worry about avoiding conceiving a child
without being “married.” This is in part because specialness entails some
exclusivity, and in part because the specialness of certain social institu-
tions derives in large part from their connection to family history and
societal culture—that is, from their being the same thing with the same
meaning as was true for their grandparents and their great-grandparents
and generations of couples before that.215 Young people in this hypotheti-
214. Cf. Ronald M. Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Nov. 21, 2006 (noting that marriage’s “meanings depend[ ] on associations that have been
attached to the institution by centuries of experience”); Schneider, supra note 170, at 509-
10 (“[E]ven people ‘who still strongly adhere to the ideal of marital permanence may be
afraid to commit strongly to their marriages if they perceive a general weakening of the
ideal.’”).
215. See Schneider, supra note 170, at 511 (“The knowledge that our forebears organ-
ized their lives around the social institutions that still shape us and the belief that the lives
of our progeny will be made recognizable by their participation in those same institutions
add meaning to our lives and help inspire us as individuals and as members of society to
cherish the past and our elders and to nurture the future and our children.”).
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cal world of radically diluted and redefined marriage would be more ex-
cited by the prospect of getting a driver’s license than of getting a
marriage license.216 Being legally married would just be functional, some-
thing one does if one happens to want certain practical advantages, even
less special than “civil union” status has been for same-sex couples in
states that have adopted it, which the Movement has complained is not
the stuff of which childhood dreams are made.217
And if an extreme expansion of legal marriage would dramatically alter
perceptions and attitudes relating to marriage, how could it be impossible
for a lesser expansion to have any effect whatsoever anywhere, as advo-
cates boldly proclaim? Is there some threshold degree of expansion that
must be reached before there could possibly be any effect in any state?
Why would that be, and how would we know when it is exceeded? Advo-
cates for same-sex marriage offer no explanation or social scientific evi-
dence for their empirical claims about what can or cannot affect people’s
attitudes and behaviors. This thought experiment makes their view
facially implausible, and it remains implausible unless and until they pre-
sent a persuasive evidence-based explanation.
c. Who is higher on the slippery slope?
As a matter of fact, the reasoning of federal and state courts in order-
ing extension of legal marriage to same-sex couples contains no limiting
principles to support rejecting the next demand for legal marriage that
comes down the pike. In particular, broad statements about marriage be-
ing a fundamental right for everyone to marry the person of their choice
(which the Movement promotes, perhaps to avoid abandoning bisexuals
who want same-sex relationships) are certain to be cited by other groups
presently excluded from legal marriage. They would support the claim of
a woman who has fallen in love with an already-legally married man that
she has a fundamental right to become legally married to that man (sub-
ject to his consent), and that the first wife has a fundamental right to stay
married to that man if she so chooses. Each woman has a fundamental
right to be married to the specific individual with whom each has fallen in
love, given that he reciprocates as to each. Likewise, a brother and sister
who happen to have fallen in love with each other must have a fundamen-
tal right to a legal marriage (putting a high burden on the state to justify
infringing the right). The brother already has a statutory right to marry
some woman, but that is not good enough; he must have a fundamental
right to marry the specific person he has chosen, if she reciprocates. Simi-
larly for the sister.
216. There is also plausibility to the concern that the state’s issuing marriage licenses to
clearly non-procreative couples could confound the marriage-procreation normative asso-
ciation the state wants to instill in young people, even if the state’s doing so would not
logically entail a conflicting message. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 1002 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting).
217. See, e.g., BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 134-35.
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Polygamy and sibling marriage implicate some different state interests,
so judicial review of states’ refusal to afford legal polygamy or legal sib-
ling marriage might lead to a different final conclusion. (Notably, how-
ever, the birth defect concern with respect to siblings disappears with
same-sex sibling couples.) My point is not that legal plural marriage or
sibling marriage necessarily follows from legal same-sex marriage, but
that same-sex marriage advocates’ (implausible) view on the fundamental
right issue would also elevate the judicial scrutiny applied to anti-polyg-
amy laws and incestuous marriage exclusions, making them presump-
tively unconstitutional. Certainly under heightened scrutiny some other
existing marriage restrictions would fall more quickly than the opposite-
sex limitation. For example, statutory provisions in roughly half of states
precluding first cousins from marrying could not withstand heightened
scrutiny, given that procreating with a first cousin raises the risk of birth
defects just from 3–4 % to 4–6%, and given that those states have no
problem with recognizing first-cousin marriages effected in other states.
In fact, all the arguments advocates for same-sex marriage make also
apply to legal plural marriage, which is already shaping up to be the next
marriage-expansion cause.218 Some are even stronger in a polygamy con-
text. The fundamental right claim has some plausibility with polygamists,
because states still attempt to criminalize polygamists’ social relationships
as well as denying them legal recognition.219 Polygamists are still waiting
for their Lawrence (respect for negative liberties) and have not yet dared
hope for their Windsor. Many polygamists (e.g., Fundamentalist Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and Muslims) believe themselves
under a religious command to practice plural marriage, so they can add a
free exercise claim (and perhaps also claim to have an immutable orienta-
tion with respect to intimate relationships). Polygamists currently are far
fewer in number than gays and lesbians and have few advocates outside
their communities, rendering them far more “politically powerless” than
gays and lesbians. Polygamists have suffered a history of persecution, and
still today in some states are constantly at risk that their homes will be
raided by law enforcement.220 The animus behind anti-polygamy laws is
clear,221 whereas none toward sexual orientation minorities can be
ascribed to states’ original marriage laws. People in polygamous relation-
ships love each other and form inter-dependencies, yet feel they and their
218. See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah, 2013).
219. See, e.g., id. (invalidating Utah’s criminal prohibition against a married person “co-
habiting” with another, but only as applied to religiously-motivated polygamists and on
Free Exercise grounds); Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1990) (up-
holding anti-polygamy clause in Arizona Constitution against claim of religious freedom).
Michigan even purports to criminalize advocacy for polygamy.
220. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, The Story of A Forgotten Battle: Reviewing the Mormon
Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth Century America, 2002
B.Y.U. L. REV. 745 (2002) (describing the bigotry underlying prohibition of polygamy in
the Nineteenth Century and in the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision upholding anti-polyg-
amy laws).
221. Id. at 747-48; Nathan B. Oman, Natural Law and the Rhetoric of Empire: Reynolds
v. United States, Polygamy, and Imperialism, 88 WASH. U.L. REV. 661, 667 (2011).
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relationships are still denigrated by the vast majority of the American
population.222 They are raising children who also might benefit from their
parents’ relationships receiving legal and public validation. When one
spouse is hospitalized, the others want to visit. They could be happier and
have healthier and more stable households if the state removed the cloud
of criminalization and gave them the material benefits and dignity that
come with legal marriage. Legal plural marriage would serve the state’s
aim of confining potentially procreative sex to permanently committed
relationships. If courts recognize all this, states arguably should have to
make a stronger showing in support of their anti-polygamy laws than they
do in support of traditional opposite-sex-only marriage.
There is no clear contender for the next movement after polygamy. No
organized group of any size is challenging a marriage restriction. But it
only takes one person or couple to file a lawsuit asserting a constitutional
right to marry, and the possibilities are endless. What if a local clerk in
charge of distributing marriage license knows that the two (or five) peo-
ple in front of her, requesting a joint marriage license, are not lovers but
just friends, or that they are closely related biologically (some states’ mar-
riage license applications ask whether there is a blood or family relation-
ship) and refuses to give them a license? Platonic couples could charge
the states with coercing them into sexual intimacy if denied a marriage
license because they are not “true couples.” As with polygamy, states still
attempt to criminalize intimate relations among lovers closely related to
each other, biologically or by adoption or affinity,223 so “incestuous”
couples have a much stronger argument (a negative-rights claim) for hav-
ing a fundamental right to legal marriage (with its attendant authoriza-
tion of intimacy) than do same-sex couples today (though, again, the state
could assert different countervailing interests). There are innumerable
underage couples, and surely there are some who decide they want to get
married but who cannot get their parents’ permission. They could chal-
lenge age restrictions and parental consent requirements just as pregnant
minors have done with abortion restrictions.224 To the extent courts reaf-
firm the supposed fundamentality of a right to marry, while also predicat-
ing the right on the material benefits and dignity that legal marriage
entails, and are disdainful of state explanations in terms of incentivizing
222. See, e.g., BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 257 (lumping “plural marriage” to-
gether with incest and “unions of people and animals” and characterizing it as an “absurd
concept”), 258 (implying that practiced polygamy is so rife with abuse it is categorically
different from same-sex relationships).
223. See, e.g., Lowe v. Swanson, 639 F.Supp.2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (rejecting a sub-
stantive due process challenge to a state law criminalizing sex between a step-parent and
step-child even as applied to a consensual relationship with an adult step-daughter).
224. Cf. Kirkpatrick v. District Court, 64 P.3d 1056 (Nev. 2003) (rejecting a non-custo-
dial father’s claim that court approval of his 15-year-old daughter’s request to marry a 48
year old man, without giving the father even notice of the hearing, violated his procedural
due process rights, based in part on a premise that the child had a constitutional right to
marry).
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desirable behavior, they will find it difficult rationally to deny to anyone a
constitutional right to legal marriage.
And in addition to the club becoming less exclusive, there is the prob-
lem for the state that every new group of entrants to marriage increases
the cost of whatever material benefits the state attaches to the status—
benefits that unmarried taxpayers must subsidize. This is true both for
direct state subsidies and for mandates relating to spouses that the state
imposes on insurers and employers; someone must bear the added gov-
ernment or corporate costs of expanding the marriage category. Any ex-
pansion of marriage could therefore induce legislators to reduce those
benefits and dilute the mandates, and thus incidentally to diminish the
attractiveness of marriage for all.
There is therefore plausible basis for legislators realistically to believe
that same-sex marriage is a step toward the end of marriage as the sort of
institution that gives young people a reason to hold off on having sex or
to be more careful about sex. The legislators could be wrong; reasonable
people can disagree in their predictions about the future effect of ex-
panding marriage laws, and it might well be that the worry is more plausi-
ble in some areas (e.g., the Bible Belt) than in others (e.g., New
England). But the Constitution establishes a preference for majoritarian
decision-making when reasonable people can disagree, and decision mak-
ing at the state level with respect to domestic relations.
d. Club membership psychology
A final thought experiment further reinforces the point here. Now im-
agine that states, instead of eliminating legal marriage and instead of ex-
panding its availability, retain the institution and restrict its availability.
For example, they might henceforth refuse a marriage license to anyone
previously married and divorced. Persons otherwise eligible for legal
marriage get only one shot. Is it not possible that this constriction of the
law could restore some of the lost sparkle to marriage, make it more spe-
cial and therefore more worth aspiring to? And at the same time make it
something young people do not want to be pressured into by an acciden-
tal pregnancy, knowing they only get one chance? And might this not, in
turn, enhance the efficacy of marriage in reducing accidental procreation
outside of committed relationships among never-married people? It
should cause young people to ask themselves more often and more con-
sciously when attracted to someone: “Is this person marriage worthy?” A
negative answer should make that person less attractive even for dating.
Another possible constriction would be excluding people previously
convicted of felony domestic violence. A state might do this as the result
of lobbying by feminist organizations and advocates for victims of domes-
tic violence, who have said that unless and until the state imposes this
restriction on marriage they will refuse to participate in the legal institu-
tion. They argue that abusers do not serve one of marriage law’s other
purposes—that is, encouraging permanent commitment between people
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likely to provide each other loving support—and that allowing abusers to
marry tarnishes marriage’s sacred image. Would it be implausible for the
state in that situation to conclude that its decision whether to allow one
group to marry could affect the choices of another group whether to
marry? Whether the attitude underlying any group’s decision to reject
marriage is commendable is irrelevant, if the state has reason to prefer
that they continue to embrace marriage and the normative precepts that
attach to it.
Relatedly, legislators might draw on their knowledge of human nature
when it comes to belonging to clubs. Marriage is something of a club, like
the priesthood, a law school faculty, or the Supreme Court bar. An “ex-
clusive club” is generally seen as better, and those who get in feel fortu-
nate. If particular membership requirements are dropped, the value of
membership declines. Importantly, the devaluation for existing club
members is likely greater if they have not opened the door wider volunta-
rily but rather have had it pried open from outside, by persons they previ-
ously considered unqualified for membership forcibly breaking in. In
addition to the devaluation, there is likely also to be resentment if the
break-in is publicly defended with illogical and disingenuous arguments.
These are facts about human psychology overlooked when advocates and
judges confidently assert that judicially-mandated inclusion of same-sex
couples in legal marriage could not possibly have any effect on incentives
for any opposite-sex couples to get legally married.
Legislators might also draw lessons from history—in particular, past
instances of institutions being forced to allow new entrants. What is gen-
erally overlooked in discussions about backlash in connection with same-
sex marriage is that the backlash following civil rights victories was not
limited to violence and legislative rollbacks. The most enduring backlash
effect, arguably, has been exit from the institutional site of cultural con-
flict. White conservatives’ flight from public schools following the Warren
Court’s desegregation and school prayer decisions should give pause to
anyone inclined to think transformation of institutions does not make an-
yone rethink whether they want to belong to those institutions.225 So, too,
should feminist and LGBT scholars’ arguments urging rejection of mar-
riage as a life course because of what it “stands for.”226 People every-
where care about who else belongs to organizations and institutions they
225. See, e.g., Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity
Rationale on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 486 (2014) (discussing white
flight and noting: “Public schools are more segregated now than they were at the time of
Brown v. Board of Education.”).
226. See, e.g., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 164, 165 (Robert M. Baird &
Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997) (“Marriage runs contrary to two of the primary goals of
the lesbian and gay movement: the affirmation of gay identity and culture and the valida-
tion of many forms of relationships.”) Murray, supra note 158, at 7 (“feminists and queer
theorists have emphasized marriage’s role as a vehicle of state regulation and discipline,
and many have been skeptical of marriage and social movements predicated on securing
marriage rights for marginalized groups.”); Martha Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 239, 261-63 (2001).
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contemplate joining, and what those organizations and institutions “stand
for.” And they strongly prefer voluntarily to welcome new members into
the “clubs” to which they subscribe rather than being forced to admit a
new category of members. Perhaps the situation is entirely different with
same-sex marriage, but what honest person could assert with unqualified
confidence that it is so?
There are some reasons not to worry about a similar flight from mar-
riage. First, schools are different; the Court’s school decisions directly and
significantly altered the daily experience of dissenters’ children. Opening
legal marriage to same-sex couples (in dissenters’ minds) merely changes
the meaning of marriage, sending a message that parents can mediate
with their children. However, reaction to secularization of the schools has
been mostly concern about the message this sends children, and a large
group of parents ever since has been so troubled by the godlessness of the
state education system that the parents have not only exited public
schools but entirely rejected the authority of the state with respect to
their children’s education, retreating to church basement schools and
homeschools by the millions and successfully defying efforts at govern-
ment oversight.
Second, there could be countervailing effects of the same-sex marriage
movement. It can enhance the perceived value of a club that others are
clamoring to get in. But their actually getting in forcibly and thereby di-
minishing the exclusivity likely nullifies that. Some heterosexuals believe
the institution of marriage is tainted by exclusion of same-sex couples,
and we will value legal marriage more when it is also available to same-
sex couples. But for how many people this is true, we have no idea. Same-
sex marriage might also for some people restore to marriage some of the
legitimacy it has lost to valid feminist criticisms of the traditional patriar-
chal model, if it inspires by example more egalitarian marital norms, but
that is quite speculative.
What is certain is that predictions about the effects of court-ordered
same-sex marriage (or lack thereof) are necessarily speculative. This is
not a conceptual or logical question, so categorical stances are indefen-
sible. We simply do not know. And for purposes of constitutional analy-
sis, if rational basis review applies, as it should, legislators’ knowledge of
human nature in relation to “clubs,” and of the history of Supreme Court
decisions triggering an exodus of dissenters from public institutions like
public schools, surely gives them adequate basis for assuming that ex-
tending legal marriage to same-sex couples could have a negative impact
on the attitudes and behaviors of many people who are capable of acci-
dental procreation, especially given that this particular extension might
make it more difficult to continue excluding some other groups.
Again, though, this is not something the state needs to allege and sup-
port. It need not argue that excluding same-sex couples from legal mar-
riage serves the responsible-procreation function. It need only argue that
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including them would not serve that function (properly understood),
which no one disputes.
4. Marriage and adoption of the “unwanted”
I have saved for last the most absurd judicial response to date to the
state’s argument that one of its aims is to deter extramarital pregnancy.
This is Judge Posner’s adoption argument:
Unintentional offspring are the children most likely to be put up for
adoption, and if not adopted, to end up in a foster home. Accidental
pregnancies are the major source of unwanted children, and un-
wanted children are a major problem for society, which is doubtless
the reason homosexuals are permitted to adopt in most states . . . If
the fact that a child’s parents are married enhances the child’s pros-
pects for a happy and successful life, as Indiana believes not without
reason, this should be true whether the child’s parents are natural or
adoptive . . . . Married homosexuals are more likely to want to adopt
than unmarried ones if only because of the many state and federal
benefits to which married people are entitled. And so same-sex mar-
riage improves the prospects of unintended children by increasing
the number and resources of prospective adopters. Notably, same-
sex couples are more likely to adopt foster children than opposite-
sex couples are . . . . Also, the more willing adopters there are, not
only the fewer children there will be in foster care or being raised by
single mothers but also the fewer abortions there will be. Carrying a
baby to term and putting the baby up for adoption is an alternative
to abortion for a pregnant woman who thinks that as a single mother
she could not cope with the baby . . . . Accidental pregnancies are
found among married couples as well as unmarried couples, and
among individuals who are not in a committed relationship and have
sexual intercourse that results in an unintended pregnancy. But the
state believes that married couples are less likely to abandon a child
of the marriage even if the child’s birth was unintended.227
In this ramble, Posner says several patently false and illogical things,
beginning with the very first sentence. The reality is that even though
41% of births in the United States today are extramarital, voluntary relin-
quishment and abandonment of babies by their parents are virtually non-
existent.228 Unwed mothers keep their children and apply for welfare
benefits, and that is the principal reason why accidental extramarital preg-
nancy is enormously costly to states. So unless Posner has in mind that the
state should begin terminating the parental rights of unwed mothers at
the time they give birth, solely because they are not married, adoption
227. Baskin, 766 F.3d 648, 660-62 (7th Cir. 2014).
228. See Jo Jones, Adoption Experiences of Women and Men and Demand for Children
to Adopt by Women 18-44 Years of Age in the United States, 2002, VITAL AND HEALTH
STATISTICS SER. 16, (2008) (“[I]n 2002. . . the domestic supply of infants relinquished at
birth or within the first month of life and available to be adopted had become virtually
nonexistent.”).
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(and, secondarily, same-sex marriage) is not in any way a solution to the
problem of single mothers straining the welfare system.
Further, for every one of the few babies whose birth mothers do relin-
quish them in a private placement adoption, leave them at a “safe ha-
ven,” or otherwise abandon them, there are thousands of married
heterosexual couples competing with each other to adopt.229 As Posner
well knows, the pool of adults wanting to adopt and qualified to do so has
long dwarfed the number of infants “unwanted” by their birth parents.230
That is why international adoption became a large phenomenon in the
latter part of the twentieth century. Hundreds of thousands of couples
desperate to adopt an infant have traveled across the globe, spent tens of
thousands of dollars, struggled with foreign language and foreign (often
corrupt) bureaucracies, and weathered charges of imperialism after giving
up hope of winning the infant-adoption lottery in this country. Adding
more couples to an already-hopelessly long queue would do absolutely
nothing to help accidentally conceived children whose mothers relinquish
or abandon them. They are fine. They are not a problem for the state;
eager adopters generally absorb whatever costs their existence creates.
The overwhelming percentage of children available for adoption in this
country are actually “put up” by the foster care system, following invol-
untary termination of parental rights years after the children’s birth, dur-
ing which time the children are typically permanently damaged by
maltreatment or foster care drift.231 Those children are not “unwanted”
by their birth parents. The people who do not want them are the vast
majority of adults interested in adoption, and that is why some states have
long permitted same-sex couples to adopt. We have no idea how many of
these children resulted from unintended extramarital pregnancies, so
there is no basis for drawing even a highly attenuated logical connection
between unintended extramarital pregnancy and adoption of children
from foster care. It is certainly possible that allowing same-sex couples to
marry would encourage more of them to adopt from foster care children
who are unwanted by the enormous existing pool of people wanting to
229. See id. at 12, 22, 25 tbl.7 (showing 900,000 women currently seeking to adopt, most
of them married, including 228,000 black women and 195,000 Hispanic women); id. at 16,
33 tbl.15 (showing that over half of these women express indifference about the race of the
child, only one-fifth of white women seeking to adopt express a preference for a white
child, half express a preference for a child less than two-years old, and 89% would accept a
child with a mild disability); Brian H. Bix, Perfectionist Policies in Family Law, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1055, 1061 & n.37 (citing statistics and noting that “given the current supply and
demand for children for adoption, there is every reason to believe that a baby given up
immediately after birth would have no trouble finding a loving home”). Elizabeth
Bartholet, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOP-
TION ALTERNATIVE 7 (1999) (“The potential pool of adoptive parents is enormous—it
dwarfs the pool of waiting children. About 1.2 million women are infertile and 7.1 percent
of married couples, or 2.1 million.”).
230. See Posner, supra note 198, at 61. Scare quotes here because “unwanted” is an
overly simplistic characterization of the feelings of women who relinquish or abandon their
children. The decision is traumatizing for many, perhaps most.
231. See generally, James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2008).
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adopt, but reducing the foster care population is a state aim quite differ-
ent from that of preventing unintentional non-marital pregnancies, and
the Seventh Circuit has no business telling states that they must pursue
that highly-speculative improvement in the situation of already-existing
children in foster care by revising their marriage laws. It is absurd to sug-
gest that a solution to the rampant problem of extramarital pregnancy is
to make it slightly more likely that an accidentally conceived child could
be adopted years later out of the costly foster care system, should they
happen to be removed at some point from the custody of parents who
decided at their birth to keep them, and if their parents fail to secure their
return after years of costly child protection agency efforts to rehabilitate
them, and if the state ultimately completes a costly legal proceeding to
terminate the birth parents’ rights.
Posner’s incoherent musings about adoption of “unwanted” children
might be excused as simply terribly confused. But two other aspects of
the passage above make his rejecting the state interest in preventing non-
marital pregnancies appear cynically dishonest. His suggestion that in-
creasing the pool of potential adoptive parents would reduce the number
of abortions rests entirely on a supposition that the existing pool is inade-
quate, making pregnant girls and women fear that if they do not abort
their babies then the babies will end up never having a family. As noted
above, Posner is fully aware that that supposition is absolutely false. The
very premise of his so-called “baby selling” thesis is that there is now a
great imbalance in the adoption “market” between the huge number of
highly-motivated buyers and the very small number of willing sellers, an
imbalance he believes is created artificially by regulatory interference in
the form of severe restrictions on transfer of money from buyers to sell-
ers. In an article entitled The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, he
wrote:
On the demand side, many married couples are unable to have chil-
dren and want to adopt them . . . . Childless couples who try to adopt
through an adoption agency find that they must join a long queue
and that even then they may be ineligible to adopt—not because
they would be unfit parents but because the agencies, having a very
limited supply of babies, set demanding (and sometimes arbitrary)
criteria of age, income, race, and religion to limit demand to
supply.232
The situation for would-be adopters of infants has only gotten worse since
Posner wrote that, in large part because the option of international adop-
tion has been disappearing, as UNICEF has coerced many “feeder coun-
tries” into shutting down their trans-national adoption programs.233 Any
woman contemplating abortion today, regardless of race, if she receives
any counseling at all as to alternatives, will be told quite plainly and
232. See Posner, supra note 198, at 61.
233. See James G. Dwyer, Inter-Country Adoption and the Special Rights Fallacy, 35 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 189, 204 (2013).
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truthfully that she could have her pick among thousands of affluent mar-
ried heterosexual couples, including the full range of races, religions, and
other personal characteristics that might matter to her. It is inconceivable
that it would alter the decision making of such women one iota to add
“and there are some gay couples who would also be interested.”
In sum, the state interest in minimizing accidental extramarital
pregnancies is an entirely legitimate, genuine, and long-standing one. It is
arguably a compelling state interest given the impact on many individual
lives (of girls and young women who become pregnant and then abort or
forego education and career) that such pregnancies occasion on top of the
short-term costs (various welfare benefits) and long-term costs (poorer
developmental outcomes) these children occasion for the state;234 and the
legal system and legal scholars have long recognized the connection be-
tween that state interest and the state’s attempt, by maintaining and sub-
sidizing a legal status of “married,” to bolster the social institution of
solemnized marriage, traditionally the approved site for procreation, in
the hope that the moral message of “wait till you are married” can con-
tinue to have some efficacy in altering the behavior of unmarried heter-
osexuals. As a family law scholar, I cannot honestly deny the validity of
this constitutional defense of traditional marriage laws, even though for
me personally other considerations tip the public policy and moral bal-
ance in favor of legal same-sex marriage.
IV. WISHING CAREFULLY
The Movement, its supporters, and judges deciding in their favor see
only victory in judicially-mandated extension of legal marriage to same-
sex couples. They are wrong. What is lost becomes evident when one
imagines an alternative outcome. Imagine what might ensue following a
Supreme Court decision against same-sex marriage. Or to be more pre-
cise, a Supreme Court ruling that all the modern state constitutional pro-
visions blocking legislative adoption of same-sex marriage violate the
federal constitution, but traditional state statutory marriage laws do not.
Such an outcome would throw the question clearly and definitively into
the political arena. The Movement would then return its focus to trying to
persuade people. Given its extraordinary success in doing that in recent
years, the end result would certainly eventually be majoritarian embrace
of same-sex marriage throughout the country—statisticians predict within
a decade.235 This result should not trigger much backlash nor slow the
progress toward universal acceptance. Some would still oppose the
234. See Solomon-Fears, supra note 198, at 2 (“ [A] large body of research indicates
that children who grow up with only one biological parent in the home are more likely
to . . . have worse socioeconomic outcomes. . . 44-46% of children who lived with their
mothers only, two unmarried parents, or no parents were living below the poverty level. . . .
children living in single-parent families are more likely to face negative outcomes (finan-
cially, socially, and emotionally). . .”).
235. See KLARMAN, supra note 30, at 202; id. at 193-203 (describing the inevitability, if
current trends continue, of a political victory for the Movement).
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change, but they could not psychologically draw support from being in
the majority. To the contrary, the larger group to which they belong, the
people of their state, will have decided collectively to make this change,
by a process all endorse. In contrast, judges, especially federal judges, are
outsiders to the community, pitting themselves against the community. If
“we the people” decide to authorize same-sex legal marriage, all a dis-
senter can say is “I still think it’s wrong, and we shouldn’t have done it,”
which seems less likely to ossify animosity or provoke violence than, “We
know it’s wrong and those god-forsaking elitists in the federal govern-
ment have no right to force it down our throats.”
Conversely, then, a Supreme Court victory could make the LGBT
community worse off in terms of what many say is the real objective—
dignity. Dignity can mean at least a couple of things. Anti-sodomy laws
denied one kind of dignity—namely, being spared humiliating invasions
and exposures. Lawrence delivered that kind of dignity. Another kind of
dignity is recognition-respect, and that is what is at stake in marriage liti-
gation. Kennedy characterized the federal government’s denial of marital
status to couples whose states had given them marriage certificates as an
insult to that sort of dignity, and he seemed to believe the Court’s deci-
sion in Windsor would restore or generate dignity. But he was wrong.
Federal and state DOMAs are legislative enactments, expressions of
collective societal views and values. Courts can order states to eliminate
practical reminders of what LGBT persons perceive as social disrespect,
such as having to file tax returns as a single person, but courts cannot
order the people to change their attitude. Courts thus cannot deliver the
type of dignity that comprises social respect. In fact, the message judges
send to sexual minorities when they invalidate state marriage laws on
constitutional grounds is precisely the opposite of the “we the people re-
spect you” that legislative victories give LGBT persons. Judicial invalida-
tion of laws amounts to judges speaking contrary to “we the people.”
Federal judges have been saying, in effect: “We are helping you because
your fellow citizens do not respect you enough to do it themselves.” It
accentuates the lack of recognition-respect.
That discouraging message is all the more powerful when a court invali-
dates a law after ascribing suspect class status to a group, as the Seventh
Circuit did. Judge Posner’s message to gays and lesbians (which is actually
false) is that they are so despised in their state that they cannot hope to
convince legislators to respond to their needs. They need a few people in
a position of power insulated from popular will, people representing not
their state but the federal government (i.e., federal judges), to override
popular will in their state. The Seventh Circuit’s decision could only di-
minish the LGBT community’s perception of social respect, not enhance
it. Similarly, if a court were to order my local government agencies to
eliminate all religious trappings from their offices and meetings, that
would not make me feel more welcomed by the people at those places
and events, and it might actually make me feel even less welcome.
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Importantly, a judicial victory obviates legislative change, and there-
fore collective or majoritarian expression of respect. If the Supreme
Court holds that all states must amend their marriage laws to authorize
same-sex marriage, LGBT persons in most states will never have the op-
portunity to experience a welcome extended by the people of their state.
They must forever view the people of their state as having been against
them. Correspondingly, we who want to participate in a collective expres-
sion of recognition-respect will never have the chance; the courts will
have taken away the opportunity.
Thus, celebrations following these court victories have a false air about
them, in some cases a painful irony. For example, the trial court decision
in Perry came out soon after polls showed a major shift in popular atti-
tude toward Proposition 8, with a majority of Californians then favoring
same-sex marriage and only 20% believing Prop 8 was a “good thing.”236
A new referendum reversing Prop 8 would likely have succeeded. But
gays and lesbians in California never got to feel the embrace of the state’s
people that a vote to reverse Prop 8 could have given them. Instead, they
celebrated that one man agreed with them.237 Perhaps they preferred to
wield power over those who had voted against them, to play the judicial
trump, instead of letting those people redeem themselves. That would be
understandable, but the gratification would likely be fleeting. Similarly,
even before the Supreme Court decided not to accept an appeal of the
Tenth Circuit decision in Kitchen, a poll showed Utah public opinion had
tipped in favor of same-sex marriage.238
Defenders of the litigation strategy contend that court orders changing
the law in states where a majority are still opposed to same-sex marriage
are one step toward popular acceptance. After the law changes, same-sex
couples marry and everyone sees that the sky does not fall. Over time, the
new law comes to seem normal, old people get tired of complaining about
it, young people grow up presupposing it.
That reasoning is far more plausible at the beginning of a movement
for social change. Goodridge is a good illustration. The thesis makes far
less sense today, when many states already have legal marriage for same-
sex couples and so have shown that the sky does not fall. Today, it seems
court orders are more likely to slow or completely halt the favorable shift
in public opinion, by ending the public conversation and generating re-
sentment. Seeking court victories implicitly expresses disdain for the pub-
lic whose respect they hope to obtain, which cannot help. The push for a
Supreme Court solution appears to have been driven more by impatience
and a desire among lawyers and plaintiffs to get their names in history
books, rather than by wisdom and a well-considered judgment about how
236. See BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 188.
237. Id. at 189-92.
238. See Marissa Lang, Poll: Utahns evenly split as Supreme Court considers gay mar-
riage—It’s 49 percent yes vs. 48 percent no., THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept. 29 2014.
2015] Same-Sex Cynicism 69
best to secure dignity for sexual minorities.239
What if it were possible to change course now? Imagine a counter-fac-
tual reality in which the leaders of the gay movement go on national tele-
vision today and announce that they are suspending their litigation
strategy permanently and plaintiffs have chosen to withdraw their suits.
They have decided that they do not want to win that way. They do not
want to force themselves and their desire for legal recognition on their
fellow citizens, as deeply important as that recognition is to them. They
respect their fellow citizens enough to let them decide for themselves:
Will they extend a hand of welcome and reciprocal respect? The Move-
ment has decided to leave it to the people and their elected
representatives.
Movement leaders ask people across the nation, all riveted to their
televisions, not to just forget about them now, but to have a national con-
versation about this important issue, and conversations in every state and
community, with everyone able to express their thoughts, beliefs, values,
and feelings. They begin this process by having some couples stand for-
ward and describe what marriage means to them, their children, and their
extended family and friends, just as same-sex couples have been doing for
judges in courtrooms.240
And imagine the people in a state where the traditional rules still apply
responding, launching that conversation in newspapers, television and ra-
dio programs, in churches and fraternal organizations, in universities, in
door-to-door dissemination of information. And then they vote. A sub-
stantial majority votes yes. Millions and millions say yes to their LGBT
brothers and sisters. How different the morning after would be for sexual
minorities. They could walk the streets expecting smiles rather than
threats. They can know that the people of their state—not just a few dis-
tant sympathizers in robes—accepted them, said to them: “You are equal,
and you are one of us.”
And how different life would be for those who want to extend the col-
lective welcome. Having that opportunity restored to us would not only
be gratifying but would also give us a way to do something besides ob-
serving from the sidelines (or writing amicus briefs of dubious integrity),
a way concretely to demonstrate our support, to use whatever power we
239. A response that the lawyers are simply doing what clients want would not ring
true. Much same-sex litigation has been lawyer-initiated rather than client-initiated. The
lawyers are supporting Supreme Court review of their own cases even though they won at
the Circuit Court level. The plaintiffs’ lawyers seem to have made no effort to coordinate
in order to steer the Court toward the case that is actually best for the cause. They are all
on a Path to Glory.
240. Cf. KLARMAN, supra note 30, at 198-99 (describing moving public statements by
gay or lesbian persons, conveying their personal experience, and deeply affecting their
audiences); BOIES & OLSON, supra note 10, at 127-29 (describing testimony of Perry litiga-
tion plaintiffs and saying “Jeff had succeeded in putting a human face on what the fight for
marriage equality was all about, far better than any lawyer’s brief or argument could”), 136
(“We felt that if everyone in America could hear that testimony [of Sandy Stier], and the
words and feelings of Kris, Jeff, and Paul, opposition to marriage equality would melt
away.”).
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have to give our gay brothers and lesbian sisters what they wish. I think of
state legislators in my state who applauded a federal court ruling in favor
of same-sex marriage. How pathetic they were as supporters. They were
in a position of much greater power, with the ready ability to introduce
legislation and lobby other lawmakers, but they stood by watching.
Life would also be different ever after for those who now oppose same-
sex marriage (and possibly other rights for sexual minorities) but who
open their minds when they hear what Movement leaders say, because
the message they receive is one of respect rather than dismissiveness.
They are willing then to listen carefully to what gay and lesbian couples
say, rethink their position, and then autonomously revise their views, vol-
untarily giving something that is important to them (their support), and
thereby having the valuable experience of moral growth, magnanimity,
rational reflection, and solidarity. They would be changed by this experi-
ence, and their disposition toward LGBT persons would ever after be
more positive.241
Societally, we would benefit from having acted like a community of
caring and mutually respectful human beings. We lose the opportunity to
do that every time courts short-circuit democratic decision-making by
handing down constitutional mandates. Of course, sometimes it is best for
society that courts do this, and sometimes individuals are entitled to
courts’ doing it even if it is not best for society. The Constitution exists for
a reason, and courts should give it effect when appropriate. But there is a
cost each time, and when the constitutional basis for a court order is so
weak, to the point that even a sympathetic observer like myself finds it
quite implausible, the courts are likely to disserve the community unjusti-
fiably. If instead the Movement called off the lawyers, withdrew their lob-
byists from Congress and state legislatures, and spoke directly with the
people, showing respect to those who currently oppose them, displaying a
nobility of character that should generate reciprocal respect, we might
together experience something extraordinarily valuable, which we could
replicate when other controversies arise.
The obvious response to the alternative story is a cynical one that it is
fiction unlikely to become reality any time soon, if ever. But it is a story
with a happy ending that the constitutional litigation strategy never can
deliver. It is worth thinking, again, whether it is worth waiting for that far
better ending, and whether the Movement and its supporters have done
all they can to generate the kind of national conversation that could begin
the alternative story.
241. Cf. Jeremy W. Peters & Jonathan Martin, Gay Marriage Case Offers Republicans
Political Cover, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2015 (explaining how the Supreme Court’s grant
of certiorari in DeBoer spared conservative legislators from even having to discuss same-
sex marriage, let alone take and explain a position).
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V. CONCLUSION
Today opposite-sex-only marriage laws clearly fall into the category of
permissible policy choices that we supporters of same-sex marriage
should be seeking to change through public persuasion and the political
process, not the courts. Our doing so would demonstrate respect not only
for constitutional principles and the democratic process but also for peo-
ple who now disagree with us, and that in turn should minimize resent-
ment and backlash. It would also offer a realistic possibility for achieving
something courts cannot give LGBT persons—namely, the kind of dig-
nity they seek.
My own brand of cynicism, though, is to doubt that those on my side of
the issue politically will do the right thing legally. They will continue to
bypass the public, who require more patience than federal judges do, and
they will continue to make disingenuous arguments in their effort to se-
cure a national judicial mandate. When the Supreme Court issues that
mandate, it will do so with the narrowest and least intelligible explanation
possible. But that will not dampen the victory celebrations. “The cause” is
not about constitutional principles. It is not really about marriage. It is
about people who are like anyone else except they happen to be attracted
to others of the same sex, and who seek equal standing in our community
today, after a long history of brutal subordination. For a moment, they
will feel like they have achieved that. I hope they still feel that way the
next day.
Yet questions like these trouble me: Am I destined for the rest of my
career to have a depressing discussion about cynical lawyering and judg-
ing every time I get to same-sex marriage in my family law class? How
will the Court explain to the American people that their wonderful col-
lective (albeit not universal) change in attitude is meaningless, that they
still cannot be trusted with democratic deliberation and decision-making
when it comes to equality for LGBT persons? How will the Justices ex-
plain to other groups excluded from legal marriage their issuing a deci-
sion tailored to give victory only to sexual minorities, without endorsing
any principles that could be used by other groups about whom the Jus-
tices do not happen to care at this time? Or to parents why the Court
declared that the aim of inducing young people to avoid conceiving a
child till they are married is a silly or imaginary one, not something wor-
thy of state support? Will sexual minorities feel safer and more welcome
as a result of a Court decision forcing acceptance on people presumed to
be unwilling? And will there be any other way, after the Court has obvi-
ated our support for marriage equality, that we in the sexual-orientation
majority can communicate collectively the welcome, the apology, and the
appreciation that people who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered
are owed?
